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“citizens” of different states. In Section 1332(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code,
Congress has provided that for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, corporations are citizens
of the state in which they are incorporated and the state in which their principal place of
business is located. This raises the question whether corporations are citizens within the
original public meaning of Article III of the Constitution. This Article demonstrates that in
1787 the word “citizen” referred only to natural persons and therefore that corporations
cannot be considered “citizens” within the original public meaning of Article III. As a
consequence, insofar as Congress purports to confer constitutional citizenship on
corporations, Section 1332(c) is unconstitutional from an originalist perspective.
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INTRODUCTION
Just before his death in 1875, Benjamin Curtis, the great Dred Scott
dissenter, lectured Harvard law students on “one of the most . . . difficult
questions on the subject of parties”: “jurisdiction over corporations.”1
In the preceding decades, the Supreme Court had extended diversity
jurisdiction over corporate parties.2 Yet, noted Curtis, “[i]t has been from first
to last admitted that corporations are not citizens” within the meaning of Article
III’s Diversity of Citizenship Clause (or any other provision of the
Constitution).3 As a work around, the Marshall Court, in Bank of United States
v. Deveaux, had held that parties suing corporations could rely on the diverse
state citizenship of corporate shareholders.4 To defang the bite of the complete
diversity requirement, the Taney Court later adopted a conclusive presumption
that shareholders are citizens of a single state—the one that created the
corporation.5
That presumption, Curtis told his students, is a “falsehood”—identical to
the infamous fictions that the Court of the King’s Bench had used to expand its
jurisdiction vis-a-vis Common Pleas centuries earlier.6 However, he cautioned,
“there is not the slightest reason to suppose it will ever be departed from by the
court.”7
Despite a post-Hobby Lobby surge of scholarly interest in corporate
constitutional rights, originalists have not paid much attention to the corporate
right to diversity jurisdiction that so perplexed Justice Curtis. The omission begs
to be rectified. Corporate diversity jurisdiction is, after all, among the oldest,
most practically important, and frequently utilized of corporate constitutional
rights. It is, most recently, the foundation for sweeping expansions of federal
power over corporate litigation in the Class Action Fairness Act.8 What does
originalism mean for corporations’ continued access to the federal diversity
docket and all that comes with it?
The Article begins to answer that question by investigating the original
1. This lecture, part of a series of lectures on federal jurisdiction, was posthumously published in 1880.
See BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF
THE UNITED STATES 127 (George Ticknor Curtis & Benjamin R. Curtis eds., 1880).
2. Id. at 129–33.
3. Id. at 128. Indeed, “it may fairly be said that neither the framers of the Constitution nor framers of the
Judiciary Act had corporations in view” when they authorized federal courts to hear “controversies between
citizens of different states.” Id. at 128; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
4. CURTIS, supra note 1, at 129–32. The case is Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
5. Id. at 132–33. The case that adopted this presumption is Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 57 U.S.
314 (1853). In a prior case, Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844), the Court
allowed the corporation to claim the state that was simultaneously its state of incorporation and the place it
conducts its business as its state of citizenship on two rationales—a narrower holding that allowed the
corporation to borrow the citizenship of shareholders who were citizens of that state, and a broader holding that
suggested the corporation itself was a citizen of that state, without regard to the citizenship of any of its members.
43 U.S. at 554–57 (narrower holding); id. at 557–58 (broader holding); see also Michael Collins & Ann
Woolhandler, Judicial Federalism Under Marshall and Taney, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 347–51, 362–65 (2018).
6. CURTIS, supra note 1, at 130–32.
7. Id. at 133.
8. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in various sections of 28
U.S.C.).

172

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:169

public meaning of “citizens” in Article III of the United States Constitution.
We say “begins,” because assessing the scope of diversity jurisdiction over
corporations requires answering not one but two questions. The first is whether
corporations, considered as abstract legal “persons” with an identity separate
from their shareholders, are state “citizens” within the meaning of Article III—
the proposition Curtis said had “from first to last” been rejected. The second is
whether corporations, if not themselves citizens, can rely on the diverse
citizenship of the natural persons who “own” the corporation (the shareholders),
the route pursued in Deveaux and other antebellum cases reviewed by Curtis.
This Article is limited to the first question—were corporations “citizens”
within the original meaning of the Diversity of Citizenship Clause? This
question requires its own article because it ranges across multiple provisions,
each ratified at different times.
One, of course, is Article III’s Diversity of Citizenship Clause itself,
ratified in 1788. It provides: “The judicial power shall extend . . . to
controversies . . . between citizens of different states.”9
However, the Article III term we are concerned with, “citizen,” was
modified after the Civil War by the Fourteenth Amendment.10 In Dred Scott v.
Sandford, the Taney Court held that African Americans were not “citizens
of . . . [a] state[]” within the meaning of the Article III Diversity Clause or the
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.11 The Fourteenth Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause overturned Dred Scott by supplying a master definition of
citizen applicable to both of these clauses.
The upshot is that determining whether corporations are citizens for Article
III purposes requires an inquiry into the meaning of “citizen” not just at the close
of the eighteenth century, when Article III was adopted; but in the middle of the
nineteenth century, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
We will take each period in turn. Below, we will show that at the end of
the 1780s, the exact meaning of “citizen” was contested. But the word
communicated at least one agreed upon piece of information to ordinary
Americans: namely, that a person was a proper object of an expectation of
allegiance to a political community, implied from the nature of the person’s
connection to the relevant state. Because, in turn, allegiance was an “affective”
bond—a moral “sentiment” characteristic only of natural persons—“citizen” at
the close of the eighteenth century was a status that was conceptually and
linguistically limited to natural persons. This limitation, we show, was
pervasively reflected in period usage. Corporations were therefore not textual
diversity citizens when the Diversity Clause was ratified.
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
10. An earlier modification came through the 1795 ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. A response to
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), this amendment withdraws Article III jurisdiction over controversies
between states, on one hand, and citizens of another state or foreign citizens, on the other. Because it does not
directly affect the grant of jurisdiction over controversies confined to citizens of different states, this amendment
is not our immediate focus. But because it is practically contemporaneous with ratification of Article III, our
evidence about late eighteenth-century usage applies to its use of “citizen,” in any event.
11. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405–27 (1857).
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Next, we turn to the 1860s. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship
Clause offered what the original Constitution had lacked—a master definition
of “citizens”: “All persons” “born or naturalized in” and “subject to the
jurisdiction” of the United States are citizens of the United States and of the state
in which they reside. In 1868, we will show, “born” and “naturalized” “citizens”
were terms limited to natural persons. As a result, the Fourteenth Amendment’s
definition continued to confine “citizen” to natural persons—while clarifying
that the term was open without regard to one arbitrary characteristic of natural
persons, their race. Corporations were not citizens in the 1780s and did not
become so through the Fourteenth Amendment.12
Here is the road map for our argument. Part I briefly outlines our approach,
“public meaning originalism.” Part II lays the groundwork for our historical
investigation by identifying the nature of the word “citizen” as a “sortal” and
reflecting on the theoretical challenges facing our attempt to recover its original
meaning. Part III makes the case that corporations cannot be “citizens” as that
term was understood by the public in the initial framing period. Part IV shows
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause continued to define
citizenship as a status unique to natural persons. We end with a conclusion that
restates our thesis and identifies additional issues that must be resolved in order
to formulate an originalist doctrine regarding corporate diversity jurisdiction.

I. PUBLIC MEANING ORIGINALISM
The theoretical framework for our inquiry is provided by “public meaning
originalism”—a member of the originalist family of constitutional theories. In
this Part of the Article, we outline our theoretical perspective by reviewing the
key foundational ideas of public meaning originalism. In addition, we briefly
outline the role that original public meaning can play in nonoriginalist
constitutional theories such as constitutional pluralism.

12. The words “citizen” and “citizens” appear elsewhere in the Constitution. In Article III, the word
“citizens” appears five times other than the Diversity of Citizenship Clause, corresponding to the other distinct
forms of subject-matter jurisdiction involving “citizens”: (1) state-citizen diversity jurisdiction, (2) land grant
jurisdiction, (3) state-foreign citizen jurisdiction, (4) United States citizen-foreign state jurisdiction, and (5)
United States citizen-foreign citizen jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. It also appears in the practically
contemporaneous Eleventh Amendment See supra note 10 and accompanying text. In addition, “citizen” or
“citizens” appear in Article I’s specifications of the qualifications for members of the House of Representatives
and the Senate, Article II’s specification of qualifications for the President, as well as the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, § 3, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see
also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Finally, “citizens” appears in voting rights provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment, Nineteenth Amendment, Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and the TwentySixth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; id. amend. XV, § 1; id. amend. XIX, § 1; id. amend.
XXIV, § 1; id. amend. XXVI, § 1. The focus of this Article is on the original public meaning of “citizen” in the
context of the Diversity of Citizenship Clause of Article III, but our findings extend to the other occurrences of
“citizens” in Article III, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. The original public meaning
of “citizen” and “citizens” elsewhere in the Constitution may well be identical to what we describe herein, but
that issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
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A. THE ORIGINALIST FAMILY OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES
Originalism is best viewed as a family of constitutional theories, almost all
of which affirm two ideas:
The Fixation Thesis: The communicative content of the constitutional text is
fixed at the time each constitutional provision is framed and ratified.
The Constraint Principle: The legal content of constitutional doctrines and the
decision of constitutional cases should, at a minimum, be consistent with and
fairly derivable from the communicative content of the constitutional text.

These statements are intended to be precise and they are stated using
technical terms, but the intuitive ideas behind the Fixation Thesis and the
Constraint Principle are simple. The Fixation Thesis expresses the commonsense idea that the linguistic meaning of a writing is fixed at the time it is
authored: even though the words and phrases may acquire new meanings at a
later time because of linguistic drift.13 The Fixation Thesis pins original meaning
to the point in time when a constitutional provision was framed and ratified:
Article III and the rest of the unamended Constitution was drafted in 1787 and
the ratification process became effective in 1788;14 the public meaning of Article
III was fixed during that period. The Constraint Principle summarizes the idea
that the constitutional text is binding: judges may not adopt constitutional
constructions that are constitutional amendments in disguise.15 As applied to
Article III diversity jurisdiction, the Constraint Principle would require that
constitutional doctrine be made consistent with the original meaning of
“citizen,” which, as we shall demonstrate, does not include corporations.
Almost all originalists agree on fixation and constraint, but there are
disagreements about other topics. The most significant area of disagreement
concerns the nature of original meaning. Although public meaning originalism
is the predominant view, original intentions originalism,16 original methods
originalism,17 and original law originalism also have adherents. Our
13. The case for the Fixation Thesis is stated in Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of
Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. R EV. 1 (2015).
14. On June 21, 1788, New Hampshire ratified the Constitution, satisfying the Article VII threshold of nine
states. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1
(2001).
15. A defense of the Constraint Principle is provided in Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle:
Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice (Apr. 3, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215.
16. See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That
English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967,
969 (2004) (“Full blooded intentionalists consider all available evidence of the actual author’s intended
meaning.”). An important variation of original intentions originalism (the “new intentionalism”) emphasizes the
communicative intentions of the Framers. See Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE
OF ORIGINALISM 87 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); see also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative
Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493, 510 n.57 (2005); John F.
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 72 n.7 (2006).
17. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 765–72 (2009); see also John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1321, 1332 (2018) (explicating the language-of-the-law thesis as part of Original Methods Originalism).
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investigation of “citizens” relies on public meaning originalism, although much
of the evidence that we present could also be used to reach similar conclusions
from the perspective of alternative versions of originalism.
B. THE INTERPRETATION-CONSTRUCTION DISTINCTION
Public meaning originalism can and should affirm the interpretationconstruction distinction,18 which can be summarized as follows:
Constitutional Interpretation is stipulated to be the activity that discerns the
meaning (understood as communicative content conveyed by linguistic
meaning in context) of the constitutional text.
Constitutional Construction is stipulated to be the activity that determines the
legal effect (including the decision of constitutional cases and the specification
of constitutional doctrines) given to the constitutional text.

This distinction expresses the intuitive idea that the meaning of a text is
one thing, but the legal effect is another. Thus, constitutional provisions are
given legal effect both through the decision of constitutional cases and judicially
crafted implementing rules and other constitutional doctrines.
The process of interpretation and construction might involve two steps:
first, the judge discovers the meaning of the text (“interpretation”), and second,
the judge determines the legal effect of the text.19 In some cases, the meaning of
the text will be sufficiently precise to determine the legal effect. In other cases,
the text may be underdeterminate, because the words and phrases are vague or
open textured, or for some other reason.20 We can call the set of cases and issues
for which the text is underdeterminate the “construction zone”—expressing the
idea that in such cases, constitutional construction is necessary to determine
legal effect.21
C. THE PUBLIC MEANING THESIS
Public meaning originalism affirms the Public Meaning Thesis, which can
be stated as follows:
The Public Meaning Thesis is the claim that the best understanding of original
meaning is the content communicated or made accessible to the public by the
18. On the interpretation-construction distinction, see generally Lawrence B. Solum, The InterpretationConstruction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) [hereinafter Solum, The Interpretation-Construction
Distinction]; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453
(2013). For the history of the distinction in the context of contract law, see Gregory Klass, Contracts,
Constitutions, and Getting the Interpretation-Construction Distinction Right, 18 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 13
(2020).
19. This simple picture does not fully capture the actual process. Judges may begin with construction and
then check their view of what the law should be against the text. And as a theoretical matter, the decision as to
what meaning (for example, public meaning versus drafter’s intent) should be recovered must precede
interpretation. We are grateful to Gregory Klass for emphasizing the importance of this point. See Klass, supra
note 18, at 15 (“What meaning a text or other speech act has depends on the questions one asks of it.”).
20. In addition to vagueness and open texture, underdeterminacy may result from gaps or contradictions in
the text.
21. See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 18, at 108 (introducing the phrase
“construction zone” to refer to the set of cases and issues that are underdetermined by the communicative content
of a legal text).

176

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:169

text at the time each constitutional provision was framed and ratified.22

This thesis is predicated on an understanding of the situation of
constitutional communication: the constitutional text was written for the public.
For the most part, the text was written in ordinary language, comprehensible to
ordinary citizens who spoke American English (at the relevant time). Some
constitutional provisions use technical language: the phrase “Letters of Marque
and Reprisal” is an example.23 But so long as the use of specialized language
would have been apparent to readers and the technical meaning could be
discerned with reasonable effort, the meaning of the Constitution would have
been accessible to the public.24
D. ORIGINALIST METHODOLOGY
How can public meaning be recovered? In this Article, we are investigating
the meaning of “citizen.” On the one hand, the word “citizen” has a familiar
meaning that refers to a status that persons have in relationship to a political
community: John Adams was a citizen of the United States and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. On the other hand, “citizen” is a complex
concept used in both law and political philosophy: the status of citizen has
eligibility conditions and carries with it a set of rights and responsibilities. Our
goal is to recover the original public meaning of the word “citizen” and thereby
to recover the concept of citizenship as it was understood in the framing era. In
order to accomplish this task, we will use some of the familiar tools of originalist
methodology. These tools include: (1) the investigation of semantic meanings
using period dictionaries and corpus linguistics, (2) the study of the
constitutional record, including both the history of framing and ratification as
well as the wider intellectual context that would have been familiar to many who
participated in the framing and ratification of Article III, and (3) immersion in
the linguistic world of the late eighteenth century. We develop an innovative
way to make the third method tractable in this context.25
E. THE ROLE OF ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING IN NONORIGINALIST
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES
Although this Article is written from an originalist perspective, we believe
our results are relevant to lawyers, judges, and legal scholars who reject
originalism. There are many different forms of living constitutionalism,26 but
22. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis: Communicative Content Is the Original Meaning
of the Constitutional Text (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
24. Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 429–
31 (2009) (discussing the role of the division of linguistic labor and technical meaning).
25. On originalist methodology, see Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus
Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1643, 1649, 1670–71 (2017)
[hereinafter Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning]; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI.
L. REV. 269, 270 (2017).
26. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of
the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1271–76 (2019).
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one of the most important strands of contemporary nonoriginalist constitutional
theory is “constitutional pluralism,” the view that there are “multiple modalities”
or plural methods of constitutional argument. The list of modalities is contested,
but a representative list would include the constitutional text and structure,
historical practice, precedent, constitutional values, and workability. For
pluralists who believe that the constitutional text is one of the modalities of
constitutional interpretation and construction, the original meaning of “citizen”
will be relevant to the interpretation of the Diversity Clause—even if it is not a
decisive factor.27
Of course, some living constitutionalists may reject the relevance of
original meaning altogether.28 We believe, however, that rejection of the
constitutional text as a relevant factor is rare among nonoriginalist judges. We
are not aware of empirical research on this question, but we believe that very
few judges or Justices would affirm the proposition that original meaning is
completely irrelevant. For that reason, we believe that our findings are relevant
to lawyers and almost all judges—even if some legal scholars would reject
original meaning as a factor in constitutional interpretation and construction.

II. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “CITIZEN”: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS
“Citizen’s” relationship to corporations is often presented as a simple-tosolve originalist question—too simple to justify the effort we expend below.29
Reality is different. Because the concept of citizenship predated the rise of the
modern corporation, assessing how Article III’s original semantic content bears
on modern corporations’ “citizen” status turns out to pose some thorny
challenges.
This Part explains these challenges and how we deal with them. Subpart A
starts by introducing some concepts from the philosophy of language that inform
our analysis. Supbart B.1 introduces the problem just discussed and then shows
why some seemingly promising solutions turn out to be dead ends. Subpart B.2
then identifies the way forward¾and, in the process, briefly sketches the basic
claim we will develop in later Parts.
Supbart C, finally, ends with an overview of some evidentiary hurdles our
investigation will face along the way—as well as our method for surmounting
them.

27. There are several versions of constitutional pluralism, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1753, 1753 (1994) (“Pluralistic theories of constitutional interpretation hold that there are multiple legitimate
methods of interpreting the Constitution.”); Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and
the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739, 1751–84 (2013); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1252–69 (1987).
28. For example, constitutional rejectionism, the view that the constitutional text should play no role in
constitutional adjudication, would also seem to reject the relevance of original meaning for constitutional
practice. See generally LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012).
29. See infra note 38.
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A. “SORTALS”
Many words perform a “sorting” function—their semantic meaning allows
us to sort individual people or things into a category or conceptual set.30 We will
call such terms “sortal” terms or “sortals.” 31
To perform its sorting function, a sortal’s semantic meaning conveys
identity criteria—criteria specifying conditions for assigning an individual
object to the set that the sortal describes.32 “Dog,” for example, communicates
identity criteria that allow us to distinguish some animals from others by
reference to criteria that define the property of being a dog (say, “a four-legged
domesticated animal having a long snout that barks” or more technically, “a
mammal with a specified set of genetic properties”).
The identity criteria of some sortals (say, “shoe”) limit their set to
inanimate objects. Others, like “man” or “woman,” limit that set to animate
objects, and others, like “corporation,” describe “abstract objects.”33 Some
sortals, finally, are further restricted—that is, their meaning is limited to a subcategory of a kind. “Bachelor” is such a sortally restrictive word—its meaning
not only conveys the state of being unmarried, a quality of an animate object
(human beings), but refers only to a restricted kind of human being: historically,
adult males.34
Citizen is a sortal.35 And it has some obvious identity criteria. For example,
all agreed at the relevant time periods that “citizen” was a status limited to
“persons.”36 Our task is determining whether the meaning of citizen conveyed
additional identity criteria that restricted the term to natural persons only or that
also reached abstract objects conceptualized as “persons,” like corporations.37
B. IDENTIFYING THE SORTAL CONTENT OF CITIZENSHIP
Having identified our task, we turn to history. In this Part, we begin in
30. This is a characteristic it shares with all “status” concepts. See Paul B. Miller, The Idea of Status in
Fiduciary Law, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 25, 25 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds.,
2016) (noting that status is a “method of . . . categorization”).
31. In the philosophy of language, sortals are often defined as terms whose semantic meaning supplies
criteria for individuating countable kinds, which is consistent with our use of the term. Richard E. Grandy,
Sortals, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2016),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2016/entries/sortals/; Fred Feldman, Sortal Predicates, 7 NOȖS 268, 269 (1973) (discussing the criteria of
sortalhood).
32. In the technical literature, these are sometimes called “counting criteria.” See Grandy, supra note 31.
33. For discussion of a corporation as an “abstract object,” see Grandy, supra note 31 (discussing “sortals
for abstract objects,” which include “ideas,” “governments,” and “corporations”).
34. David Ian Beaver, Presupposition, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 939, 944 (Johan van
Benthem & Alice ter Meulen eds., 1997) (identifying “bachelor” as a sortally restrictive predicate). It is possible
that gendered terms like bachelor are gradually becoming gender neutral and hence that the feminine equivalent
term “bachelorette” and the older term “spinster” are falling out use; if so, then “bachelor” may eventually come
to refer to unmarried adults irrespective of gender.
35. SORAN READER, NEEDS AND MORAL NECESSITY 106 (2007) (noting citizen’s sortal status).
36. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *333–36 (1765) (treating
of the laws of alienage and subjecthood as legal statuses of “persons”); 1 JOHN BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF
AMERICAN LAW 57–84 (1851) (treating statuses of citizen, subject, and alien as statuses of “persons”).
37. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *455–73 (considering corporations under the heading of the rights of
persons, and classifying corporate entities as “artificial” persons).
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Subpart B.1 by identifying a problem: the fact that “citizen” was not applied to
corporations in 1787, although relevant, will not suffice to establish that modern
corporations stand outside the original meaning of “citizen.”
This Part then surveys some possible solutions to this problem, which turn
out to be dead ends, before identifying the path forward in Subpart B.2, which
we will then develop in the remainder of the Article.
1. Application Patterns as Pro Tanto Evidence
When we turn to 1787, one intuitive route to investigating this question is
to examine whether there is a pattern, in the 1780s, of applying citizen
exclusively to human beings. And, indeed, there was just such a pattern, as
others have noted.38 We review this pattern later.39 Some will find it, by itself,
decisive proof that corporations are not Article III citizens.
These patterns of usage provide powerful evidence that the term “citizens”
was conceptually limited to natural persons. But this evidence is pro tanto
evidence and not decisive evidence. Evidence is “pro tanto” if it provides
genuine support for a proposition, but is, nonetheless, consistent with the
possibility that the proposition is false. Evidence is “decisive” if it is conclusive
and therefore inconsistent with the possibility that the proposition is false.
The fact that the word “citizen” was solely used to refer to human beings
not corporations in the eighteenth century could, at least in theory, be consistent
with the conclusion that the original meaning of the term citizens nonetheless
embraces modern corporations. For this reason, this evidence, although strongly
supportive of the conclusion that the word “citizens” is limited to natural persons
is not, by itself, decisive.
How is it possible that the original meaning of the word “citizens” could
extend to modern corporations despite the fact that “citizens” was only to apply
38. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 65
(2018) (suggesting in cursory fashion that the tile of citizen “was reserved for human beings” in the framing
period); Martin H. Redish & Peter B. Siegal, Constitutional Adjudication, Free Expression, and the Fashionable
Art of Corporation Bashing, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1447, 1456 (2013) (reviewing TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2012)) (noting in passing that “no corporation
is a citizen in the purely ‘literal’ sense of the term” and characterizing the reasons that corporations have been
treated as citizens under the Diversity Clause as purely “instrumental”); Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation
as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221, 238–45, 261–65 (2011) (collecting evidence
that “citizen” was universally applied to “corporeal beings” during the relevant constitutional framing periods);
Brandon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384, 407 (2003) (expressing doubt about whether the framers
intended the term “citizen” to encompass corporations); George F. Carpinello, State Protective Legislation and
Nonresident Corporations: The Privileges and Immunities Clause as a Treaty of Nondiscrimination, 73 IOWA
L. REV. 351, 380 (1988) (noting that “[o]ne might conclude . . . that because the framers were not thinking of
corporations when they used the term ‘citizen,’ it would be contravening the original intent to include them
today,” but disagreeing with this conclusion based on an appeal to the framers’ “goals”); Dudley O. McGovney,
A Supreme Court Fiction: Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 56 HARV.
L. REV. 853, 861 (1943) (noting, albeit with a focus on nineteenth century caselaw, that “[the Supreme Court]
has from beginning to the end held consistently and persistently that ‘citizen’ connotes a human being”); Charles
Warren, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship, 19 VA. L. REV. 661, 662 (1933) (“That the framers . . . ever
contemplated that [the grant of diversity jurisdiction in the first Judiciary Act] would apply to corporations is
extremely improbable,” given the infrequency of private corporations in the late eighteenth century).
39. See infra Part III.B.3.
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to natural persons in the late eighteenth century? Consider the following thought
experiment. Imagine, for example, that “citizen” meant “all legal persons” who
are conceptualized as “private” (that is, having an identity apart from the state)
and as “proper objects of a state’s general jurisdiction.” (This is the basic sense
in which citizen, as it is used in Article III, is sometimes understood today).40 If
corporations in the eighteenth century were conceptualized as arms of the
state—and thus not a “private” person41—then we would observe the pattern we
see in eighteenth-century linguistic usage. Citizen’s meaning would embrace
natural persons in their private capacity, but not eighteenth-century corporations.
But it would do no damage to the term’s original meaning to extend it to modern
corporations, which are both conceptualized as private persons and as proper
objects of a state’s general jurisdiction.42
To be clear, we are not arguing that the linguistic evidence shows that this
possibility was actually the case. The point of the thought experiment positing
this possible state of linguistic affairs in the eighteenth century is to show that
the failure to refer to eighteenth-century corporations as “citizens” does not
logically entail the conclusion that twenty-first century corporations fall outside
the eighteenth-century concept.
To then decisively demonstrate modern corporations are not proper objects
of the original conventional meaning of “citizen,” we have to cast beyond the
pattern of applications of the word “citizen” observed in eighteenth-century
practice (of using “citizens” only when referencing natural persons) and
recapture the positive semantic content of citizen—the concept it conveyed, and
the identity criteria entailed by that concept.
The starting point for recovering those identity criteria is the Constitution’s
text. Article III uses the term “citizen” without defining it. In 1787, though, other
clauses suggested definitional criteria. Article II’s qualifications clause limited
the presidency to “natural born citizen[s]” of the “United States.”43 And Article
I vested Congress with power over “naturalization.”44 Together, both clauses
suggested that citizens are persons who are either “natural born” or
“naturalized.” Because corporations are abstract entities and cannot be born, it
seems to follow that they cannot be “natural born.” And because they cannot be
natural born, it might be argued that they are not the sort of entity that can be
“naturalized.” Hence, these phrases might be thought to establish that the
positive meaning of the word “citizen” only extends to natural persons, for
example, human beings or members of the species “homo sapiens.”45
The complication with treating these express criteria as the identity criteria
of “citizen” is that nothing in the antebellum Constitution specifies these were
40. Compare Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010), with Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
41. See infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
42. See infra Part III.B.3.
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States,
at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President.”).
44. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
45. We leave aside the question whether extraterrestrial aliens or an evolved intelligent animal species
might be considered natural persons and hence citizens if they were born in the United States.
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the only criteria for “citizenship.”46 Moreover, the presidential qualification
clause relates to citizenship of “the United States.”47 And the naturalization
clause has long been held to have a similar focus.48 Relying on either clause to
infer the original 1787 meaning of an Article III “citizen[] of [a] State[]”
accordingly implicates a notoriously thorny set of interpretive questions about
the relationship between “state” citizenship, “United States” citizenship, and
diversity jurisdiction under the antebellum Constitution.49
We start at a different place, one that allows us to side-step those questions.
The public meaning of the Constitution’s text is its conventional, or popular,
meaning—the meaning words convey to ordinary users of English. While some
words (“terms of art”) are technical—impossible for ordinary users to
understand without reference to a legal specialist—the word “citizen” was
widely used in popular sources and conveyed some implicit semantic content to
ordinary English speakers.

46. Both criteria, to be sure, were the sum of the common law formula for “subjecthood,” which divided
full subjects (as opposed to “denizens”) into native born and naturalized. See infra notes 70–73, 168 and
accompanying text. Even so, Locke and international law writers familiar to the framers suggested contractual
criteria distinct from the common law formula might be relevant to “citizenship.” ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC
IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 78–80, 130 (1997) (discussing role of Lockean
consensualism in theories of citizenship, including its influence on international law theorists like Burlamaqi
and Vattel, and noting framers failed to resolve the tension between consensualism and “ascriptive” common
law criteria for state membership). Nor is it clear Americans uniformly understood the concepts “born”
citizenship or “naturalization,” in the 1780s, in ways consistent with the common law usage of either term. See
JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 231–32 (1978) (noting
uncertainty about the power of states and the federal government to distinguish between natives, accepting some
as “natural born” citizens and rejecting others); SMITH, supra, at 130 (discussing ambiguity of “natural born
citizenship,” although noting framers likely used it in the common law sense).
47. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Relationship Between Obligations and Rights of Citizens, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1721, 1724 (2001) (“The original Constitution mentions national citizenship only in the
presidential qualification clause . . . .”).
48. Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. R EV. 869,
890 n.90 (2015) (noting the standard view that the naturalization clause regulates admission to national
citizenship). But see KETTNER, supra note 46, at 231–32 (noting uncertainty, after ratification, about whether
the naturalization power was “merely an administrative reform designed to standardize admission to state
membership or a recognition that citizenship . . . primarily meant membership in a national community”)
49. In 1787, the relationship between citizens “of” a state and citizens “of the United States,” and the
relevance of citizenship “of the United States” to diversity jurisdiction were far from clear. KETTNER, supra note
46, at 231–32 (“The framers dealt with the [nature of individual citizenship] tangentially, and, in consequence,
the constitutional provisions involving citizenship contained profound ambiguities that would become apparent
only long after the new government went into operation.”). That uncertainty played out over the antebellum
period, coming to a head in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). There, Chief Justice Taney and Benjamin
Curtis both agreed with the basic principle that developed in the early decades of the Republic that “a citizen of
the United States, residing in any State of the Union, is, for purposes of jurisdiction, a citizen of that state.” See
id. at 571 (Curtis, J., dissenting); see also Prentiss v. Barton, 19 F. Cas. 1276, 1276–77 (C.C.D. Va. 1819)
(Marshall, J.). But they disagreed about the conditions for citizenship in the “United States.” Taney’s infamous
opinion contended national citizenship was governed by standards independent of state law, which he contended
included race-based criteria. Scott, 60 U.S. at 404–07. Justice Curtis advocated the more common antebellum
view, that citizenship in the United States was, with respect to natives, entirely derivative of state law. Id. at
577–82 (Curtis, J., dissenting); see also DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 71 (1978) (the general antebellum position was to “regard state citizenship as
primary, with United States citizenship deriving from it”). Other antebellum commentators took the view that
the national citizenship was governed by the non-racial criteria of the common law. See infra notes 240–246 and
accompanying text; see also Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 619–20 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (treating the issue of
national citizenship as a judicial question governed by the common law, at least absent national legislation to
the contrary).
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That implicit content determined what the word “citizen” conveyed to the
public in the context of Article III and therefore it provides the constitutional
meaning of “citizen.” To enjoy the rights of constitutional citizenship, whether
the word is used in relation to “states” or “the United States,” one must meet
“citizen’s” original popular identity criteria. If corporations do not meet those
criteria, they were not “citizens,” state or federal, within the original public
meaning of the Constitution of 1787.50
Our focus is on this implicit content. When we turn toward identity criteria
implicit in the term’s popular meaning, a common impulse is to focus on what
(if anything) “citizen” popularly conveyed about someone’s legal entitlements,
and then reason backward from that information to a conclusion about who
“belongs” to the set of “citizens.” 51 Thus, if the right to vote is fundamental to
the popular concept of citizenship, we could characterize the popular meaning
of citizenship as “a person who is entitled to vote.” We might then reason that if
corporations are not the kind of thing that is a proper object of the “right to vote,”
corporations do not meet the popular identity criteria for “citizens.”
Once again, this evidence provides only pro tanto support for the
proposition that only natural persons could be citizens. First, in the 1780s, it was
far from clear what rights, exactly, were intrinsic to citizenship. Some 1780s
accounts of citizenship associated the word with the enjoyment of a set of
fundamental civil, but not political, rights—equal rights to own, convey, and
inherit property, or travel freely, for example—some of which seem perfectly
coherent to ascribe to corporations.52 Others associated citizenship with political
50. As a result, the content of “state citizenship” for purposes of Article III may differ in material ways
from the state’s local definition of “citizen.” An environmentally conscious state might, for example, define
“trees” as “citizens” of the state. If, however, trees don’t meet the popular identity criteria of original citizenship,
they would not qualify as “citizens” of the state for purposes of rights conferred on citizens of a state by the
federal constitution. In this, we take a position consistent with Justice Marshall’s construction of Article III in
Prentiss, 19 F. Cas. at 1276 (holding that Article III “citizenship” is a question of federal law). The concept of
state citizenship in Article III may bear some resemblance to a “patterning definition,” under which the original
popular meaning of citizen sets baseline criteria for Article III “citizenship,” some of which operate
independently of subconstitutional law (limiting constitutional citizenship to natural persons), while others refer
to the content of legal backdrops external to the constitution (for example, specifying that to be a state citizen, a
natural person must satisfy certain common law or state law requirements, depending on which backdrop
relevant legal analysis points us toward.) Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86
VA. L. REV. 885, 893 (2000) (using a patterning definition approach to constitutional “property” and concluding
that different definitions attach in different clauses that use the word “property”). See also infra note 62 and
accompanying text.
51. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 162 (1795) (Iredell, J.) defining citizens as “members of the society,”
who “claim rights in society, which it is the duty of the society to protect” and who are “in . . . turn . . . under a
solemn obligation to discharge all those duties faithfully, which he owes, as a citizen, to the society of which he
is a member”); CHARLOTTE C. WELLS, LAW AND CITIZENSHIP IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE, at xiii (1995) (noting
citizenship is generally defined as “membership in a group” that carries with it rights to “civil rights and political
rights”); id. (noting we typically “distinguish citizens by the rights they possess as members of the state”).
52. This is often termed the “liberal conception” of citizenship. Iseult Honohan, Liberal and Republican
Conceptions of Citizenship, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP 83, 85–94 (Ayalet Shachar, Rainer
Bauböck, Irene Bloemraad & Maarten Vink eds., 2017). As Charlotte Wells notes, the liberal conception is, in
fact, not modern—its origins lie in the late medieval Roman law. WELLS, supra note 51, at xv. A number of
examples of usage in the 1780s are consistent with this conception—see, for example, the use of “citizen” as a
“synonym” for “subject” in American treaties granting contracting parties’ members reciprocal rights during the
Articles of Confederation period. See, e.g., Treaty of Paris of Sept. 3, 1783, 1 MALLOY, TREATIES 468 (1910)
(referring to the “subjects of Great Britain” and the “citizens of the United States”). These reciprocity clauses,
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rights (voting, the right to hold office), which seem improper to associate with
corporations.53 As a result, focusing on the information about the type of rights
intrinsic to the term citizen does not provide decisive evidence.54
More fundamentally, though, focusing simply on whether someone is a
“proper” object of whatever rights were “fundamental” to citizenship (1) ignores
other important parts of the term’s semantic meaning in a way that (2) may cause
us to miss the inclusivity and radicality of the term.
Scott v. Sandford55 is a particularly terrible example of this kind of
analytical error. There, the Taney Court defined “citizen” as the quality of
enjoying civil or political privilege.56 But it then reasoned from the fact African
Americans had been systematically deprived of the privileges of national
citizenship to the conclusion that African Americans were not proper objects of
that status.57
The Court’s tragic mistake here, as Lincoln’s Attorney General Edward
Bates noted in 1862, was ignoring that “citizen” communicated identity criteria
apart from whatever rights the status conveyed—and those criteria performed
the crucial work of sorting who belongs to the “citizen” category and thus is
entitled to those rights.58 Those identity criteria did not include race.59 By
by equating citizens and subjects, clearly use citizen as a term for members of the body politic, inclusive of those
who did not, at the time, qualify for the elective franchise. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (stating that the Privileges and Immunities Clause secures the “fundamental” rights of
citizenship automatically guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, “to which may be added the
elective franchise,” but only to the extent “established” and “regulated” by state law); see also CHRISTOPHER R.
GREEN, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE PRIVILEGES
OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 43–45 (2015) (noting some doubt about whether Washington included the right to
suffrage among fundamental rights of citizenship, but that other cases excluded it from that category); Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 472 (1793) (“citizens” are “as to civil rights perfectly equal”).
53. This is often termed the civic republican conception of citizenship. Honohan, supra note 52, at 85–94.
For period examples adopting this definition, see JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A TREATISE ON THE SOCIAL
COMPACT; OR THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL LAW 22–23 (T. Becket & P.A. de Hondt eds., 1764) (“With regard
to the associates [of a republic or body politic] themselves, they take collectively the name of the people, and
are separately called citizens, as partaking of the sovereign authority, and subjects, as subjected to the laws of
the state.”); Denis Diderot, Citizen, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIC LIBERTY: POLITICAL ARTICLES IN THE
DICTIONARY OF DIDEROT AND D’ALEMBERT 49, 52–53 (Henry C. Clark ed., Henry C. Clark & Christine Dunn
Henderson trans., 2016) (1753) (“[O]ne has no clear distinction between subject and citizen unless the latter is
supposed to be a public man . . . .”).
54. This, indeed, may have been a component of the meaning of the term that was largely technical. In any
event, we take no firm view on the exact tranche of rights, privileges, or immunities (if any) that were
“fundamental” to the concept of citizenship during the 1787 framing period.
55. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
56. Id. at 476 (“[T]here is not, it is believed, to be found, in the theories of writers on Government, or in
any actual experiment heretofore tried, an exposition of the term citizen, which has not been understood as
conferring the actual possession and enjoyment, or the perfect right of acquisition and enjoyment, of an entire
equality of privileges, civil and political.”).
57. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 49, at 350 (noting the circularity of Taney’s argument).
58. Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 383–84 (1862) (“In most instances, within my knowledge, in which
the matter of citizenship has been discussed, the argument has not turned on the existence and the intrinsic
qualities of citizenship itself, but upon the claim of some right or privilege as belonging to and inhering in the
character of citizen. In this way we are easily led into errors of fact and principle.”).
59. Id. at 385 (“The Constitution of the United States does not declare who are and who are not citizens,
nor does it attempt to describe the constituent elements of citizenship. It leaves that quality where it found it,
resting upon the fact of home-birth, and upon the laws of the several States.”); id. at 388 (“In my opinion, the
Constitution uses the word citizen only to express the political quality of the individual in relation to the nation;
to declare he is a member of the body politic, and bound to it by the reciprocal obligation of allegiance on the
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focusing only on the rights associated with the status, and then reasoning about
whether those rights “properly” belong to a particular status-claimant, the Taney
Court had substituted its own historically and culturally conditioned
assumptions about who is a “proper” holder of the privileges of national
citizenship for the actual sortal content of “citizenship’s” public meaning.60 In
other words, the Taney Court mistook pro tanto evidence for decisive
evidence.61
2. A Way Forward
We take a different tack by turning from what rights “citizen” conveyed to
the duties it communicated. Legal status terms communicate that the statusholder occupies a commonly understood moral position, which the law treats as
legally significant. The law in turn cashes out that moral position through
workaday legal proxies for ascertaining who occupies that position and then
defines a package of legal consequences entailed by occupying it. As a result,
legal-status words like “citizen” convey a mix of popular and technical
meaning.62
We think “citizen” in 1787 worked much like this. It identified someone as
an occupier of a commonly understood moral position involving moral duties to
a political community. English-speakers understood, though, that law supplied
the exact criteria that sorted people into the position and specified the legal

one side and protection on the other.”); id. at 395 (“In every civilized country the individual is born to duties and
rights, the duty of allegiance and the right to protection; and these are correlative obligations, the one the price
of the other, and they constitute the all-sufficient bond of union between the individual and his country . . . .”).
60. The same kind of error can occur in this context (although with far less terrible normative
consequences). For example, it seems facially intuitive that if in 1787 voting was intrinsic to citizenship,
corporations would not count as such because they are not the type of persons that vote. But that intuition leads
us astray—in England, until 1832, the franchise to vote for members of Parliament, in some cases, vested not in
individuals, but in local municipal corporations (the so-called “corporation boroughs”), which exercised the vote
through the corporate council of burgesses. See Constituencies 1754-1790, HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT,
https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/research/constituencies/constituencies-1754-1790 (last visited Nov.
23, 2020). This points out that even if citizenship means someone “whose status entitles them to vote,” we can’t
rely on our historically conditioned intuitions about a “natural category” of persons who can “vote” to decide
whether corporations are or are not citizens. Nor can we simply note that corporations weren’t, in fact, given a
right to vote for any office in any relevant jurisdiction in 1787 or later—perhaps, if we consult the appropriate
identity criteria, we might learn some corporations are in fact “citizens” whose have been disenfranchised.
Instead, we need to look more closely at other identity criteria, apart from whatever rights are intrinsic to the
status, to figure out who is a proper subject of the citizen category.
61. The Taney Court also made demonstrably false claims about what the pro tanto evidence showed at
the relevant fixation period. See, e.g., FEHRENBACHER, supra note 49, at 346–54 (noting that Taney’s argument
was a “gross perversion of the facts”).
62. For more, see Miller, supra note 30, at 27 n.4 (distinguishing between moral and legal statuses, but
noting that these statuses are not “mutually exclusive” and that some legal statuses are or ought to be “informed
by a proper appreciation of moral status”); id. at 33 (“[S]tatuses designate categorically—i.e., they define a
normative position, a position to which persons or groups are assigned through the attribution of the status.”);
id. at 34 n.14 (arguing statuses are “abbreviating concepts” that using simplifying criteria to “sum up” a person’s
legal or moral position) (quoting Jeremy Waldron, Does “Equal Moral Status” Add Anything to Right Reason?
3 (N.Y.U. School of L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-52, 2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1898689); id. at 35 (“Statuses simplify semantically by
giving us a provisional conceptual characterization of the normative position held by a person, . . . thereby
relieving us of the burden of fully articulating . . . our conceptualization of that position in each and every case
we might have to refer to it.”).
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consequences of occupying that position. But the core moral concept and duties
the term conveyed were accessible to ordinary users of the English language and
drew boundaries, for lawyer and lay people alike, around who could occupy the
status.
Specifically, we will show that speakers in the 1780s, while disagreeing
about many particulars about the meaning of “citizenship,” agreed that to be a
“citizen” was to owe a reciprocal duty of “attachment” (sometimes, but not
always, described as “allegiance”) to a republican community in exchange for
its protection. This attachment, in turn, was understood as an affective or
solidaristic tie. As a result, part of what it meant to be a “citizen” was to be
“someone who was a proper object of an expectation of an affective tie to a
society or its ideals.”63
To be a proper object of an expectation of solidaristic attachment to a
community is to be someone who is capable of forming social ties. Because that
is a capacity restricted to natural persons, or human beings, “citizen” was a term
whose original conventional meaning was limited to a restricted set, natural
persons. This is the claim we will develop below.
C. THE PROBLEM OF PRESUPPOSED MEANING
Before we do, though, we need to address one last evidentiary challenge
and explain how we go about addressing it.
“Citizen,” we are claiming, is a sortally restrictive word—when used in a
sentence, it conveys a restriction on the sort of things (“persons”) that are the
word’s subject. Because, though, this sortal restriction is part of the term’s
meaning, “citizen” often calls for a “presupposition”—an inference that the
term’s subject meets its restrictive identity criteria.64 If we say that “a person is
a citizen,” the meaning of the term “citizen” calls for a presupposition that the
“person” I’m referring to is a natural person. Or if we say, “the government
must respect the rights of citizens,” the term citizen calls for a presupposition
that I am talking about the rights of natural persons.
That in turn means that one increasingly common tool for investigating
semantic meaning, corpus linguistics (or corpus analytics), turns out to be of
somewhat limited use here. Corpus linguistics provides a window into meaning
by aggregating data about usage, including information about the company that
words keep (with a focus on words that tend to travel in close proximity to the
word studied). But when the word is used in sentences like the ones above, the
studied term doesn’t need help from surrounding words to convey that the
subject of the term meets its restrictive identity criteria because “citizen” implies

63. In this our claim is similar to Attorney General Edward Bates’ characterization of the original meaning
of the term. See Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 388 (1862) (“In my opinion, the Constitution uses the word
citizen only to express . . . [that the individual] is a member of the body politic, and bound to it by a reciprocal
obligation of allegiance on the one side and protection on the other.”).
64. See Beaver, supra note 34, at 944 (“Sortally restricted predicates presuppose rather than assert that
their arguments are of the appropriate sort. For example, . . . predicative use of ‘a bachelor’ presupposes that the
predicated individual is adult and male.”).
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that restriction.
And so, if the word “citizen” is used in a lot of sentences like the examples
just given, where the “citizen’s” natural personhood is presupposed rather than
made explicit in immediately surrounding text, aggregating data about words
that “travel with” citizen may not be helpful. In linguistics, these words are
called “collocates” and corpus linguistics allows us to identify the collocates of
the word “citizen” in the late eighteenth century. Collocates of “citizen” may
convey that citizen communicates something about “persons” and “rights,”
without telling us whether it was a term whose meaning conveys something
about the rights of natural persons only. A corpus analysis of the collocates of
“citizen” can thus provide pro tanto evidence that the conceptual content of
“citizen” was limited to natural persons, but it cannot provide decisive evidence.
The same problem recurs when we try to recover the normative content the
term conveyed. As a result, uncovering the sortal restrictions embedded in the
concept of “citizen” requires what one of us has called “immersion”—that is,
careful study of usage in a fuller context than standard tools of corpus analytics,
like the compilation of a concordance, allows.65 We take a multi-pronged
approach to that task.
First, in some contexts, immersion can be aided by historians who have
already engaged in the immersive project. Below, we make liberal use of prior
historical work, which support our basic claim—that in the eighteenth century,
“citizen” conveyed a normative expectation of a kind of affective “tie” to a
political community or its creedal ideals, limiting the term to natural persons.
We will also cross-check this historical evidence with contemporaneous
statements by the framers as well as corpus-based linguistic analysis of “citizen”
in a wider context than traditional corpus analytics databases allow.66
We can do the latter linguistic analysis without having to read everything.
Unlike classic political tracts, which often used the term in an indeterminate,
generic way, literary tracts in the 1770s and 1780s use the term “citizen”
sparingly. But, when the word “citizen” appears once or twice in a work, the
word is usually chosen with intention, because its popular semantic content
reinforces the themes of the passage in which it is used. As a result, careful
critical reading of the word’s context in a wide array of period literary works
turns out to be a valuable window into the popular presuppositions about
“citizen’s” normative content.
The forgoing forms of evidence are all what we call “positive.” They
combine to paint a picture of citizen’s positive semantic content—the duties and
normative expectations the term conveyed as well as the identity criteria
embedded in that normative content. We can also, finally, further corroborate

65. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 25, at 1649–52 (discussing immersion and
distinguishing it from intellectual history).
66. For more on the use of cross-checking or triangulation in the investigation of public meaning, see id.
at 1667–81. In order to marshal a complex array of material into a coherent historical narrative for the reader,
we present this “triangulating” evidence synthetically, rather than rigidly corralling each piece of evidence into
its own discrete stand-alone section.
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our claims with what we call “negative” evidence—an absence of applications
of “citizen” at odds with our positive claims. By itself, as we discussed earlier,
evidence that citizen was only applied to natural persons in 1787 provides only
pro tanto support for our conclusion,67 but combined with the positive evidence
summarized above, it is decisive.
Together all of this evidence combines to make out a strong case that
“citizen” was a term for human beings (natural persons). We turn to that
evidence in the next Part.

III. CORPORATIONS AND THE PUBLIC MEANING OF CITIZEN IN 1787–88
Our claim, introduced in the last Part, is that in 1787–88, the crucial period
for the fixation of the original public meaning, “citizen” was a status whose
positive semantic content communicated its holder’s capacity to form
solidaristic or “affective” ties—a sortal criterion that limited the status to natural
persons.
After a short overview of our evidentiary case for this claim in Subpart A,
Subpart B turns to develop that case in detail.
Subpart B is divided between what the last Part termed “positive” and
“negative” evidence.68 The “positive evidence”—that is, evidence directly
bearing on “citizen’s” positive semantic content¾is developed across B.1 and
B.2. B.1 presents a synthesis of previous historical accounts and new primary
source evidence, in the form of contemporaneous statements by leading framers
and jurists. B.2 presents our corroborating corpus-derived data. “Negative
evidence,” or evidence that contemporaneous applications “fit” our claims about
citizen’s positive content, is then reviewed in B.3.69
Subpart C ends by introducing and rejecting a competing claim about the
original meaning of “citizen”—one that equates “citizenship” with simple
subjection to what we today would call a state’s “general jurisdiction.” We show
this claim—while more congenial to the concept of corporate
citizenship¾involves a sense of the word that arose in American usage after
Article III’s ratification. It is, therefore, no part of the Diversity Clause’s original
meaning.
A. SETTING THE STAGE
Words can become associated together in word families that form a
conceptual genus—they all share some basic semantic content. When new terms
are added to that family, they sometimes pick up some of the distinguishing
features of their semantic cousins.
This is part of the story of citizenship. It was a term that entered upon a set
stage. By the 1780s, English-speaking people had a long tradition of describing
the legal and moral relationship between a person and political community. And
67. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
68. See supra Part II.C.
69. See supra Part II.C for an overview of our use of corpus-derived evidence and negative evidence.

188

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:169

the words describing that relationship—“subject” and “alien”—shared a
conceptual boundary, or sortal restriction. They applied only to particular kinds
of persons—natural persons.
Natural born subjects were those who, because they were born under the
protection of the king, had natural allegiance to him.70 “Naturalized” subjects
were, in turn, aliens who, because they had been “adopted” through the process
of naturalization, enjoyed rights on similar terms as natural born subjects and
were also an object of expected allegiance to the king.71 Unlike natural born
subjects, their allegiance was “acquired” or volitional, not “natural born.”72 An
“alien,” finally, was someone born out of the protection of the king, and who
therefore had an allegiance to a “different Society.”73
These common law state membership categories were thus a function of
two variables: (1) information about circumstances of “birth” (whether one was
born within or without the protection of the relevant sovereign) and (2) related
information about the sovereign to whom you owed “allegiance.”
In America, the exact relationship between birth and citizenship

70. ANONYMOUS, A LAW GRAMMAR; OR, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENGLISH
JURISPRUDENCE 208 (London, G. G. J. and J. Robinson; T. Whieldon; W. Clarke; and Ogilvy and Speare 1791)
(“Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the dominions of the crown of England, that is within the
allegiance of the King . . . .”); id. at 208–09 (“Allegiance, both express and implied, is distinguished into two
species, the one natural, the other local. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the King’s
dominions . . . . Local allegiance is such as is due from an alien or stranger for so long time as he continues in
the King’s dominion and protection . . . .”). Coke noted that birth to a temporary alien sojourner in the dominion
of the King was sufficient to make a natural born subject. Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 384 (K.B.).
71. ANONYMOUS, supra note 70, at 212 (“Naturalization cannot be performed but by Act of Parliament, for
by this an alien is put exactly in the same state as if he had been born in the King’s legiance, except only that he
is incapable . . . of being a member of the privy council, member of parliament, &c.”). The power to “naturalize”
lay exclusively with Parliament. Id. The King could not “naturalize” but could ameliorate the disabilities of
alienage by making an alien a “denizen”—someone granted permanent residence and, with it, a lesser tranche
of property rights (the right to own and convey but not to inherit or transmit property through inheritance, except
in carefully defined circumstances). Id.; see also ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT: IN SIX BOOKS 165 (1795) (“When a foreigner becomes naturalized, he owes to the country which
has adopted him, the same allegiance as a natural born subject . . . .”); KETTNER, supra note 46, at 30–33.
72. The common law distinguished between “natural allegiance” or “ligentia naturalis” of the natural-born;
“acquired allegiance” or “ligentia acquisita,” which “pertained to those who were subjects not by birth, but
conquest, denization or naturalization”; and “local allegiance” or “ligentia localis,” the “allegiance” of visiting
aliens. See KETTNER, supra note 46, at 17 n.18. Natural allegiance was Coke’s focus in Calvin’s Case. Id.
Acquired allegiance gave the alien born subject to another sovereign a fictive “new birth” through consent of
the nation and “transferred all the attributes that Coke ascribed to the allegiance owed by native
Englishmen . . . [to] the adopted member.” Id. at 40, 42. Local allegiance was a more “limited” obligation of
“obedience” to local laws during a sojourn in a foreign country under the protection of the local sovereign. Id.
at 49; see also A GENTLEMAN OF THE INNER TEMPLE, A DIGEST OF THE L AWS OF ENGLAND. B EING A
CONTINUATION OF LORD CHIEF BARON COMYN’S DIGEST, BROUGHT DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME 3 (London,
W. Strahan & M. Woodfall 1776) (describing the allegiance of a visiting alien as a “temporary local allegiance,”
and contrasting it to the “permanent” natural allegiance of a subject); see also Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at
383–84 (characterizing local obedience as “wrought by the law” and “momentary and uncertain”).
73. THOMAS BLOUNT & WILLIAM NELSON, A LAW-DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY, INTERPRETING SUCH
DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE WORDS AND TERMS, AS ARE FOUND EITHER IN OUR COMMON OR STATUTE, ANCIENT
OR MODERN, LAWS 29 (3d ed. 1717) (defining an “alien” as “one born in a strange Country” or “born out of the
King’s allegiance”); 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW BY A GENTLEMAN OF THE MIDDLE
TEMPLE 76 (1736) (“An alien is one born in a strange Country and different Society, to which he is presumed to
have a natural and necessary Allegiance . . . .”); ANONYMOUS, supra note 70, at 207 (“[A]liens are such as are
born out of [the King’s allegiance].”); 1 RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, A NEW L AW DICTIONARY 30 (London,
A. Strahan & W. Woodfall 1792) (“Alien is one that is born out of the dominions of the crown of England.”).
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crystallized only in the early decades of the nineteenth century.74 And so we
defer discussing that relationship in detail until Part IV’s treatment of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause.75
In this Part, we focus, instead, on the other identity criterion of common
law subjecthood: allegiance. As we develop below, the “allegiance” about which
the terms “subject” and “alien” conveyed information was an affective tie—a
complex social attachment only real human beings can form.76 As a result,
“subject” and “alien” conveyed a basic sortal restriction. They were legal
statuses of natural persons.
This sortal restriction, the Subparts below show, was ported into the new
American state membership term, “citizenship” in the 1770s and 80s. Americans
defined “citizens” of a community, first and foremost, persons who were
properly expected to possess an affective tie to that community or its creedal
values—sometimes describing that tie as “allegiance,” but also describing it
using new cognate concepts in an effort to distance the American experiment
from the monarchies of the Old World.
The affective tie of individuals to their community was central to
citizenship; this central criterion entailed that “citizen” was, like “subject” and
“alien” before it, a word for “persons” capable of complex social attachments—
that is, real human beings.
B. THE AFFECTIVE TIE: THE ORIGINAL SORTAL CONTENT OF “CITIZEN”
We begin with the movement from “subject” to “citizen” and the role that
allegiance plays in the conceptual structure of both terms. We will then turn to
corroborating corpus evidence.
1. From the Allegiance of a “Subject” to the Affective “Tie” of a Citizen
Philip Hamburger, in his landmark survey of the English and early
American law of allegiance and protection, describes allegiance as rational rulefollowing behavior.77 To be a subject is to owe obedience to the law in exchange
for protection—a contract formed on rationally self-interested grounds.78
This though is not the only way to conceptualize allegiance. Judith Shklar,
in one of her last published works, differentiated allegiance, and related concepts
of loyalty and fidelity, from obedience.79 Obedience, she said, involves rational
rule-following behavior. Allegiance, loyalty, and fidelity are, by contrast,
“deeply affective”—they involve complex solidaristic attachments either to
abstract associations (loyalty), individuals (fidelity), or a fusion of both
74. See infra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 213–248 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 78–126 and accompanying text.
77. Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1838–40 (2009).
78. Id. at 1839 (“Underlying the reciprocal nature of allegiance and protection was the logic of consent”
and “an understanding of nature”). Blackstone’s Commentaries, as Hamburger notes, at times describes
allegiance this way: as an obligation founded in “reason and the nature of government.” Id. at 1840 (quoting 1
BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *366).
79. Judith N. Shklar, Obligation, Loyalty, Exile, 21 POL. THEORY 181, 182–85 (1993).
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(allegiance).80
Shklar’s unpacking of allegiance, in turn, comes closer than Hamburger’s
to capturing the rich way the word was used in the common law tradition.81 To
be a subject of Great Britain was to be an object not simply of an obligation of
legal obedience, but also an expectation of “affective” or solidaristic attachment
to the body politic.
The conception of allegiance as a “moral and affective” bond between king
and subject was mirrored, dramatically, in the greatest literature of the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries.82 Shakespeare described allegiance as a “love of
soul”83 and located allegiance “in” the “hearts” or “bosoms” of men. Thus, in
Henry IV, Part 1, the titular king schooled Prince Hal on how to “pluck
allegiance from men’s hearts.”84 Or in Henry V, the Earl of Westmoreland
describes “smooth” and duplicitous traitors who act “as if allegiance in their
bosom sat, crowned with faith and constant loyalty.”85
The link between allegiance and sentiment was not, though, just a dramatic
conceit. It was central to the formula of common law of subjecthood articulated
in Edward Coke’s seminal 1608 opinion in Calvin’s Case.86
“[L]igeance, and faith and trust which are her member and parts,” Coke
wrote, are qualities that the “finger of God” placed in the “soul” and “heart” of
men.87 As Lord Ellesmere would put in his 1609 summary of Calvin’s Case, it
was accordingly a tie that flowed only from natural persons to natural persons:

80. Id. at 184; see also NOAH PICKUS, TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE: IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN CIVIC
NATIONALISM 1 (2005) (noting that the “invocation of faith and allegiance” in the American oath of allegiance
“seems to suggest something deeper, a change in one’s self and belonging akin to religious conversion”).
81. Hamburger’s discussion of allegiance is more appropriate to the concept of “ligentia localis” or “local
allegiance” or aliens within the United States, which is his primary subject. See Hamburger, supra note 77, at
1847–66 (analyzing the implications of the concept of allegiance mostly with a focus on the rights of aliens
visiting or resident in the United States); see also KETTNER, supra note 46, at 49 (discussing the “limited” nature
of local allegiance); supra note 72 and accompanying text (distinguishing forms of allegiance).
82. Elliott Visconsi, Vinculum Fidei: The Tempest and the Law of Allegiance, 20 LAW & LITERATURE 1,
6 (2008).
83. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF KING JOHN act 5, sc. 1, l. 10 (referring to “[s]wearing
allegiance and the love of soul”).
84. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY IV, PART 1 act 3, sc. 2, l. 50.
85. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V act 2, sc. 2, l. 4–5. In other plays, characters warn that “cold hearts
freeze allegiance,” a metaphor that gains its power from the idea that allegiance is seated within the “heart”; and
“pray heaven, the King may never find a heart with less allegiance in it!” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE & JOHN
FLETCHER, HENRY VIII act 1, sc. 2, l. 73–74; id. act 5, sc. 2, l. 93–94.
86. Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 385 (K.B.). The case arose out of controversy of the alienage
status of the English and Scottish subjects of James I, who united the crowns of Scotland and England following
his accession to the English throne in 1603. Brought on behalf of the infant Robert Calvin, who claimed the right
of an English subject, to inherit property in England, it posed a question that Parliament had been unable to
resolve—whether James’ succession made the Scots subjects of England and the English subjects of Scotland.
For an overview of the procedural history of Calvin’s Case, see Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright
Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 80–83 (1997).
87. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 385 (“[L]igeance, and faith and trust which are her members and parts,
are qualities of the mind and soul of man . . . .”); id. at 392 (noting the duty of allegiance “is written with the
finger of God in the heart of man”). The link between natural allegiance and the soul of men was part of a broader
pattern of describing “natural” or “native” laws that are “such as are implanted in us, being written in our hearts.”
A GENTLEMAN OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, THE GROUNDS AND RUDIMENTS OF LAW AND EQUITY,
ALPHABETICALLY DIGESTED: CONTAINING A COLLECTION OF RULES AND MAXIMS 1 (1749) (distinguishing
between “native” and positive law).
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[Because] [t]his bond of allegiance . . . [or] vinculum fidei [the “bond of
faith”] . . . bindeth the soul and conscience of every subject . . . . , faith and
allegiance cannot be framed by policie, nor put into a politick bodie. An oathe
must be sworne by a natural bodie; homage and fealtie must be done by a
natural bodie, a politick bodie cannot do it.88

Allegiance was, in other words, a human sentiment of faith, trust, “love,”
and loyalty, and only a real flesh and blood person could possess, or attract, those
sentiments.89 Thus, only the fusion of the politic capacity, or protective power,
of kingship, “appropriated to the natural capacity” of human representatives,
could “draweth legiance.”90 And only a “natural bodie” could give it.91
In the 1780s, the term “citizen” supplanted “subject” as a label for members
of the American republic.92 In the process, Americans recharacterized the
88. THOMAS EGERTON, LORD ELLESMERE, THE SPEECH OF THE LORD CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND, IN THE
EXCHEQUER CHAMBER, TOUCHING THE POST-NATI 101 (London 1609).
89. BACON, supra note 73, at 76 (describing allegiance as “Faith and Love to that Prince and Country”
where the subject receives his protection); A GENTLEMAN OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, supra note 87, at 4 (“The
end of kings . . . is the well governing of the people, and their strength is in the hearts of their subjects; protection
and allegiance are reciprocal ties.”).
90. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 388–89.
91. EGERTON, supra note 88, at 101. This concept of allegiance was, in turn, the key to the case, which
dealt with the status of the infant Robert Calvin, a Scot born after James assumed the English crown. The fact
James wore two crowns proved to be the main barrier to finding that James’ succession had made his Scottish
subjects English subjects. Scots were born under the protection of the Scottish crown, Calvin’s opponents
argued, and so had no allegiance to the English crown. Coke, however, held this misapprehended the nature of
the king and allegiance. The “king” was more than just a “crown.” The king was, rather, the fusion of an
“immortal” legal complex of powers and duties (a political capacity), which was personified (given “natural
capacity”) through progressive embodiment across a succeeding line of human beings. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng.
Rep. at 389. This idea of the monarchy as an embodied or personified institution and allegiance as a human
attachment to that institution, mediated through the real human beings who embodied it, provided the principle
that resolved the dispute. The antenati (Scots born before James’ accession to the English crown) were born
under allegiance of James (then styled James VI, King of Scotland). But because at the time of their birth, James
embodied only the Scottish, but not the English monarchy, the antenati lacked a human connection necessary to
activate their allegiance to the English crown. Calvin and other postnati (those born after James accession) were
in a different situation. They born under the protection of the same natural person, James, but at the time of their
birth he embodied the institution of the monarchy of England as well as Scotland. That meant they and English
people born under either the protection of James (now also styled James I, King of England) or (far more
commonly at the time of the decision) his predecessor Queen Elizabeth, had a human relationship with an
embodiment of English monarchy, thus “knit[ting] [them] together” in what the historian James Kettner called
a shared “community of allegiance.” See Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 381 (“As the ligatures or strings do knit
together the joints of all the parts of the body, so doth ligeance join together the Sovereign and all his subject.”);
KETTNER, supra note 46, at 23–24.
92. Maximilian Koessler, “Subject,” “Citizen,” “National,” and “Permanent Allegiance”, 56 YALE L.J.
58, 58–59 (1946) (“Although the term ‘citizen’ appears as early as 1777 in the Articles of Confederation, the
use of ‘subject’ as a synonym did not become obsolete before the enactment of the Federal Constitution
(1787) . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). Even into the early nineteenth century, treatise writers like Chancellor Kent
considered the terms citizen and subject “in a degree, convertible,” with “subject” a term that described the
“citizen,” or “republican freeman,” considered in his aspect as a person subject to the laws. See 2 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258 (E.B. Clayton & James Van Norden eds., 3d ed. 1836) (“[T]he term
‘citizen’ seems to be appropriate to republican freemen, yet we are all equally, with the inhabitants of other
countries ‘subjects,’ for we are equally bound by allegiance and subjection to the government and the law of the
land.”) (note). This particular pattern of usage is the outgrowth of a long tradition of associating “citizen” with
a member of body politic considered in his “active” capacity, as someone who “serves . . . the city [or polity],”
while using “subject” to describe a member of a body politic in his passive capacity, as person subject to an
obligation of obedience to the law. See THOMAS HOBBES, MAN AND CITIZEN (DE HOMINE AND DE CIVE) 217
(Bernard Gert ed., 1991) (“[H]erein lies the difference between a free subject and a servant, that he is free indeed,
who serves only the city . . . .”); id. at 171 (“Each citizen, as also every subordinate civil person, is called the
subject of him who hath the chief command.”); see also WELLS, supra note 51, at 7–8 (medieval scholastic jurists
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allegiance once owed to a monarch as the “tie” of a “citizen.”93
But Gordon Wood writes, “[l]acking our modern appreciation of the force
of nationalism, eighteenth-century thinkers,” like their seventeenth-century
counterparts, “had difficulty conceiving of” that tie “in anything other than
personal terms.”94 And so the tie or fidelity expected of a “citizen” was often
conceived, as it had long been after Calvin’s Case, as a personal commitment of
an “individual” to other individuals. Unlike “subjecthood,” though, citizenship
involved a tie not to a monarch but to one’s fellow citizens or the wider
community or “society” of a republic.95
Thus, James Madison, weighing in on a debate over the qualifications of a
South Carolina candidate during the first congressional election, noted that
“membership” in a republican community depends on “[the] allegiance which
[we] owe to that particular society” or “new community.”96 The allegiance to
the members of that community, he argued, is “primary” and rooted in the “ties
of nature.”97 The “secondary allegiance we owe to the sovereign established by
that society.”98
The tie that made a citizen continued to be described in affective terms. In
the decades before the revolution, the link between citizenship and affection was
perhaps articulated most prominently in Emer de Vattel’s Law of Nations, first
published in an English translation in 1760.
In his treatment of the duties of “citizens,” Vattel stated that every citizen
is “obliged to entertain a sincere love for his country.”99 Those who become
citizens of a country have promised “to procure its safety and advantage as much
as is in his power: and how can he serve it with zeal, fidelity, and courage if he

believed “‘citizen’ and ‘subject’ are not antitheses but simply two different views of human beings acting in a
political capacity”; “[t]he word subditi, ‘subjects,’ . . . [did] not mean residents of subordinate territories but
rather citizens as seekers of favors from their government or in obedience to the laws they have, whether directly
or indirectly, helped to make.”).
93. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 160–64 (1795) (Iredell, J.) (defining a citizen as a “member of the
society,” meaning one owing “allegiance” to it); id. at 164 (“By allegiance, I mean, that tie by which a citizen
of the United States is a bound as a member of the society.”); see also SWIFT, supra note 71, at 163 (“Allegiance
[of an American] is defined to be the tie, that binds the subject to the state . . . .”).
94. Gordon S. Wood, Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13,
30 (1990).
95. Id. (republicans conceived of the “cement” of republican society “in terms of the individual’s
relationship to some other individual”); id. at 15 (“[R]epublicanism . . . dissolved the older monarchical
connections and presented people with alternative kinds of attachments, new sorts of social relationships” that
offered “new conceptions of the individual . . . and the individual’s relationship to the family, the state, and other
individuals.”).
96. James Madison, Citizenship, in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 180, 182 (Charles F. Hobson &
Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979).
97. Id.
98. Thus, he argued, birth within a colony established a “primary” allegiance that survived the revolution,
making inhabitants of the colony citizens upon the Declaration of Independence. Id.
99. 1 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE L AW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS § 123, at 53 (London, J. Newberry et al. 1760) (1758)
(emphasis added); id. § 120, at 52 (“The love and affection a man feels for the state of which he is a member, as
a necessary consequence of the wise and rational love he owes to himself, since his own happiness is connected
with that of his country.”). Note Vattel used the term “members” of the state and “citizens” interchangeably. Id.
§ 213, at 92 (defining “citizens” as the “members of the society”).
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has not a real love for it?”100
Vattel echoed a long tradition in medieval Roman law, which, since the
fourteenth century, had described “citizenship” as “a habitus, a deeply ingrained
inclination toward civic duty created by birth and fostered by upbringing.”101
“Born” citizens, in this civil law tradition, were those who exhibited a natural tie
of a “free” man to their fellow citizens and a natural inclination to aid and
support their native polity, and this natural tie gave rise to a reciprocal moral
claim of protection by that polity.102 Foreigners, natives of another city,
presumptively had an inborn inclination to civic attachment to that polity. But
naturalization, or adoptive citizenship, could transform that alien habitus.
“Naturalized citizens,” the historian Charlotte Wells explains, “were bound to
serve their new state . . . [and early modern European jurists argued that] [i]n
fulfilling [their] duties, they would gradually develop feelings of love and
loyalty toward their new home,” thus becoming “true citizens.”103
In the 1770s and 1780s, Americans described citizens in similar ways: as
persons with “hearts” and “feelings” or “sentiments”104 who ought to have an
affective tie to their country.105 The existence of this tie (implied from differing
100. Id. § 120, at 52.
101. WELLS, supra note 51, at 5 (discussing origins of early modern conceptions of citizenship in the work
of scholastic Italian jurists, including Bartolus de Saxoferrato and Baldus de Ubaldis).
102. Id. at 6.
103. Id. at 6; id. at 31 (noting the late medieval civilians’ view that “by changing domiciles and devoting
themselves to the new state—by behaving as citizens—individuals would, in time, be able to replace or at least
overlay the bond to their original homeland”). As Charlotte Wells recounts, the Italian account of citizenship in
turn played a formative role in sixteenth century French conceptions of national French citizenship, one that both
picked up the late medieval association between citizenship and “amicable, almost familial, relations among
citizens.” Id. at xvii, 1–15. In the seventeenth century, though, paralleling developments in English law, the
French redirected their understanding of the affective ties of a citizen toward the monarch. “The state no longer
appeared as a community, like a city; it was now held to be embodied in the person of the monarch. Devotion to
the prince [accordingly] became the most important duty of the citizen.” Id. at xvii. But, in the eighteenth century,
the older conception of the citizen—as someone with an affective tie or habitus not just to a monarchy, but to a
free “community”—experienced a revival, and “helped create a base for both legal and popular understandings
of citizenship in the years that led up to the [French] Revolution.” Id. at 130, 138. Importantly, as we will return
to later on, the French revolutionaries also cast back to the sixteenth century position that “the intention to remain
permanently fixed in France” was an important signal of the prospective citizen’s “loyalty to a community” and,
therefore, qualification for citizenship. Id. at 140–42; id. at 32–34 (discussing role of domicile in early modern
French thought); see infra note 187 and accompanying text.
104. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 202–03 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (discussing the need
to “familiarize” the national government to the “sight” and “feelings” of the “citizens”); James Wilson in the
Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 138,
140 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (referring to the “general sentiment of the citizens of America”); 8 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 397 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1907) (May 29, 1777)
(arguing, in a letter directed to “fellow citizens,” that “[i]n free states an unreserved Communication of
Sentiments, as well as an Union of Interests should always subsist between those who direct, and those who
delegate to them the Direction of public Affairs”).
105. John Adams, Abstract of the Argument (Apr. 1761), in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 134, 135 (L.
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zoebel eds., 1965) (“The only principles of public conduct that are worthy a
gentleman, or a man are, to sacrifice estate, ease, health and applause, and even life itself to the sacred calls of
his country. These manly sentiments in private life make the good citizen, in public life, the patriot and the
hero.”); John Adams, Letter to Their High Mightiness the States-General of the United Provinces (March 19,
1782), in 5 THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 251, 251 (Francis
Wharton ed., 1888) (“What good citizen in the republic, having at heart the interest of his dear country, can
dissemble or represent to himself without dismay, the sad situation to which we are reduced by the attack equally
sudden, unjust, and perfidious, of the English?”); see also PICKUS, supra note 80, at 15 (“As with the broader
discussion of citizenship during the ratification debates, no one [in the ratification and early post–ratification
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circumstances, including birth or domicile or participation in the Revolution)
was sometimes described as a moral fact that triggered a reciprocal obligation
on the part of a republican society to extend membership and the privileges and
immunities that flowed from it, and other times as a reciprocal duty that flowed
from the extension of republican liberty to the republic’s members.106
Sometimes, the “sentiments” of attachment were described as “allegiance.”
Writing several decades after the Revolution, for example, John Adams
explained that the independence movement was a revolution in what he termed
the “sentiments of allegiance”—one that, thanks to the King’s withdrawal of
protection, involved a revolution in the “minds and hearts” and “affections” of
the American people.107 Similarly, Justice Iredell in 1795’s Talbot v. Jansen
characterized the “tie” of a citizen as both “allegiance” and the “fix[ing]” of
one’s “heart and affections” on a given country.108
period] who argued about naturalization, aliens’ rights, or eligibility for officeholding disputed that attachment
to America, knowledge of the rights and principles of self–governance, and adoption of the individual habits
necessary for engagement in public life were the essential ingredients in forming new citizens.”); Wood, supra
note 94, at 30 (discussing republicans’ efforts to “replac[e] [monarchy’s] social cements with other more
affective, more emotional, more natural ties”). We are not aware of evidence that this conception of citizen was,
as it was in France, see supra note 101, indebted to civil law traditions, beyond possible diffusion of that tradition
by Vattel. Others have argued it reflects a fusion of common law conceptions of allegiance, a revived interest in
classical thought, and the sentimentalism of the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE
OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 12 (2009) (discussing the influence of
sentimentalism of Lord Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and Adam Smith on eighteenth century American
thought); RICHARD C. SINOPOLI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: L IBERALISM, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIC VIRTUE 53–62 (1992) (discussing the influence of Anglo–Scottish Enlightenment
thinkers on American conceptions of citizenship).
106. For statements suggesting citizenship as a status that awarded allegiance, see, for example, Madison,
supra note 96, at 180 (characterizing the “ties of nature” as the foundation of allegiance , which is in turn the
foundation of citizenship, because the sovereign “cannot make a citizen by any act of his own”); JOEL BARLOW,
A LETTER TO THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF FRANCE, ON THE DEFECTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1791, AND
THE EXTENT OF THE AMENDMENTS WHICH OUGHT TO BE APPLIED 36 (London, J. Johnson 1793) (suggesting that
the moral foundation that “entitle[s]” someone to citizenship and its privileges in a given community is the
“bond” or sentiment of “brotherhood” that person possesses toward the members of that community). These
claims inverted the relationship between protection and allegiance in the common law, which treated allegiance
as a “debt of gratitude” for the sovereign’s protection, thus making the sovereign the active party and the subject
the passive party in the moral relationship. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
24 (6th ed. 1771) (“Allegiance is the duty of all subjects; being the reciprocal tie of the People to the Prince, in
return for the protection he affords them . . . .” (emphasis added)); JOHN TRUSLER, A CONCISE VIEW OF THE
COMMON AND STATUTE LAW OF ENGLAND 65 (London, W. Nicoll 1781) (“[Allegiance] is a debt of gratitude,
which no change of time, place, or circumstances can cancel.”). Americans, however, also sometimes described
the reciprocal relationship of the duties of citizens and republican sovereign in the traditional way, as a reciprocal
duty that flowed from the fact of protection. See Alexander Hamilton, A Second Letter from Phocion (April
1784), in 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 1782-1786, at 530, 532–34 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962)
(arguing that by accepting “protection” of the state, citizens owe, in turn, a continuing duty of “allegiance,” thus
implicitly treating protection as genesis of the duty of allegiance, and allegiance as a debt of gratitude).
107. Letter from John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6854 (last visited Nov. 23, 2020). In the years before and after
ratification, Americans disagreed about whether allegiance, as opposed to some other term, was the appropriate
label for the “political tie” of a citizen. Compare Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 141 (1795) (argument of counsel
for Talbot) (“Allegiance and citizenship, differ, indeed, in almost every characteristic. . . . Citizenship is the
character of equality; allegiance is a badge of inferiority. Citizenship is constitutional; allegiance is personal.
Citizenship is freedom; allegiance is servitude.”), with SWIFT, supra note 71, at 163 (allegiance to the United
States, “derived to us from the oath of fealty, adopted in the feudal system, is materially varied from it, and
instead of being a badge of slavery and vassalage, is an honourable acknowledgement of subjection to legal
government”).
108. Talbot, 3 U.S. at 163–64 (Iredell, J., concurring).
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Some, like Alexander Hamilton would (in ways that paralleled descriptions
of the habitus of a citizen in the civil law tradition) describe the “tie” of a
“citizen” using (patriarchal) familial metaphors: “A dispassionate and virtuous
citizen . . . will regard his own country as a wife, to whom he is bound to be
exclusively faithful and affectionate, and he will watch with a jealous attention
every propensity of his heart to wander towards a foreign country, which he will
regard as a mistress that may pervert his fidelity, and mar his happiness.”109
Similarly, Abigail Adams, a feminist republican, would lay her claim to the
equal “character of a citizen” alongside her husband through the following verse,
which analogized the affection of a citizen to the affection toward families:
My Passions too can Sometimes Soar above,
The Houshold task assign’d me, can extend
Beyond the Narrow Sphere of families,
And take great States into th’ expanded Heart
As well as yours.110

Or, wrote Benjamin Rush, “patriotism is as much a virtue as justice, and is
as necessary for the support of societies as natural affection is for support of
families.”111 It is accordingly the “duty of every citizen of the Republic,” to
“love his fellow creatures in every part of the world, but he must cherish with a
more intense and peculiar affection, the citizens [of his own state] and the United
States.”112
James Madison described citizenship similarly. “Hearken not to the
unnatural voice,” wrote Madison in Federalist 14, “which tells you that the
people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can
no longer live together as members of the same family . . . can no longer be
fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire.”113
Others would characterize the tie of a “citizen” as, simply, a social or
creedal “affection” or “attachment.” Members of a single sovereign “union,” or
“citizens,” wrote John Jay in Federalist 2 and 5, are “joined in affection” and
share a “sentiment” of “attach[ment] to the same principles of government.” 114
109. Alexander Hamilton, For the Gazette of the United States (March-April 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 1793-1793, at 267, 267 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969).
110. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams, 10 January 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://www.mass
hist.org/digitaladams/archive/doc?id=L17830110aa&hi=1&query=father&tag=text&archive=all&rec=84&star
t=80&numRecs=222 (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
111. Benjamin Rush, To His Fellow Countrymen: On Patriotism (Oct. 20, 1773), in 1 LETTERS OF BENJAMIN
RUSH 83, 83 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1951).
112. Benjamin Rush, Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic (1798), in THE SELECTED WRITINGS
OF BENJAMIN RUSH 84, 87–96 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1947).
113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 144 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (1788) (emphasis added).
For other examples of equating the tie of a citizen-subject and body politic to familial ties, see James Otis, A
Vindication of the British Colonies (1765), in COLLECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES OTIS 183, 207
(Richard Samuelson ed., 2015) (“Our allegiance is natural, and if this be admitted of each individual in a colony,
as it must be, it would be strange to deny a natural relation between two whole bodies, between all the respective
parts of which a natural relation is admitted. Society is certainly natural . . . . As there is a natural relation
between father and son, so is there between their two families; and so is there between a mother-state or
metropolis, and its colonies.”).
114. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 91–94 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (characterizing the

196

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:169

“A citizen of America may be considered in two points of view,” said James
Wilson, “as a citizen of the general government, and as a citizen of the particular
state in which he may reside.”115 A citizen of a state is, in turn, one who has
formed “local habits and attachments.”116 George Mason, similarly, described
the “invisible principle” of republican government as “the love, the affection,
the attachment of the citizens to their laws, their freedoms, and their country.”117
Still others equated allegiance with “benevolence.” Thus, in Talbot, Justice
Paterson, after defining a citizen as someone owing allegiance, noted that one of
the defendants, Ballard, accused of aiding a foreign country, “was, and still is, a
citizen of the United States.”118 “[P]erchance,” though, said Justice Paterson, “he
should be a citizen of the world.” That “is a creature of the imagination, and far
too refined for any republic of ancient or modern times.”119 “If however, he be
a citizen of the world, the character bespeaks universal benevolence”—not just
benevolence to a particular community¾which is no less inconsistent with
“roving on the ocean in quest of plunder.”120
Employing the same association of citizenship with benevolence directed
at a community, the American Mary Wollstonecraft, Judith Sergeant Murray,
would, in her collection of essays and plays The Gleaner, metaphorically equate
philanthropy itself with “citizenship” of the world, meaning a “univer[sal]”
attachment of the “heart”:
Philanthropy, I know thy form divine,
Godlike benignity and truth are thine;
A citizen of the wide globe thou art,

“citizen” as a member of a “united people” who share a “tie” or “sentiment” of “attachment to the cause of
Union” and “attach[ment] to the same principles of government”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 5, at 101 (John Jay)
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (describing the “people” of a united sovereignty, which Jay also characterizes in
other papers as the “citizens,” as people “joined in affection”); see, e.g., Noah Pickus, “Hearken Not to the
Unnatural Voice”: Publius and the Artifice of Attachment, in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP: REDISCOVERING
AMERICAN NATIONHOOD 63 (Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn & Susan Dunn eds., 1996) (discussing the theme of
fostering the “attachment” of citizens to a national union in The Federalist Papers).
115. Robert Yates’s Minutes of the Secret Debates of the Federal Convention (May 25, 1787), in 1 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 389, 445–46 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901).
116. Id. at 446 (emphasis added) (“When the state citizen acts as citizen of the ‘general government,’” he
must “lay aside” those local attachments and “act for the general good of the whole.”).
117. Georgia’s first constitution thus recited that “[t]his Congress, therefore, as the representatives of the
people, with whom all power originates, and for whose benefit all government is intended, [is] deeply impressed
with a sense of duty to their constituents, of love to their country, and inviolable attachment to the liberties of
America.” See Constitution of the Provincial Congress of the Colony of Georgia (Apr. 15, 1776), in A TREATISE
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA § 52, at 61 (Walter McElreath ed., 1912). Similarly, its naturalization act,
required applicants to demonstrate their “attachment to the Liberties and Independence of the United States of
America.” An Act for Preventing Improper or Disafected Persons Emigrating from Other Places, and Becoming
Citizens of This State, in 19 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA pt. 2, at 162, 162–66 (Allen
D. Candler ed., 1911); see also Letter from John Brown Cutting to Thomas Jefferson (September 16, 1788), in
13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 608, 608–13 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956) (noting no neighboring nation
has “aught to fear from us” other than the risk their subjects may “voluntarily . . . commute themselves into free
citizens and thus become attached to the first empire that mankind have ever erected on the solid foundation of
truth, reason or common sense”).
118. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 153 (1795).
119. Id.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
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Expansive as the universe thy heart . . . .121

Sometimes, the duty of citizen was equated with “devotion.”122 Or, the tie
was described in new ways that harkened to the classical vita activa or publicregarding “virtue” of an ancient Roman citizen.123 Classical sources, though,
associated the virtues expected of a citizen with martial virtues—the virtue of
the citizen-solider, courage, and self-sacrifice for the good of the city.124 But
Americans, notes Gordon Wood, described the “virtue” expected of a citizen as
“affability and sociability” toward fellow citizens or (in James Wilson’s words)
“the natural and graceful expression of the social virtues.”125
To be a “citizen” was thus to occupy of a moral position in relation to a
particular community or its creedal values, defined variously as allegiance,
benevolence, affection, love, devotion, sociability, or active attachment.
Law, of course, would not (indeed could not) compel this affection in fact,
but (in an echo of the Italian civilians’ concept of how participation in republican
institutions imparts a habitus) republican institutions would help foster it.
This was, indeed, one major theme of The Federalist Papers. As Hamilton
put it in Federalist 27, the object of the new Constitution was, by ensuring sound
governance, to “conciliate the respect and attachment” of “citizens” for the new
“Union” by “touch[ing] the most sensible chords and put[ting] in motion the
most active strings of the human heart.”126
121. JUDITH SARGENT MURRAY, No. XVI Eulogium on Philanthropy—A Letter to the Gleaner from Robert
Amiticus, in 1 THE GLEANER: A MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTION 149, 149 (1798). For more on the Enlightenment
tradition of equating cosmopolitan “citizenship” with “civic sentiments” of “friendship” directed toward
humankind, rather than a portion of it, see Ursula Vogel, Cosmopolitan Loyalties and Cosmopolitan Citizenship
in the Enlightenment, in POLITICAL LOYALTY AND THE NATION -STATE 17, 45–49 (Michael Waller & Andrew
Linklater eds., 2003).
122. Thus, wrote Wilson, “[o]n the citizen under a republican government, a third duty . . . is strictly
incumbent. Whenever a competition unavoidably takes place between his interest and that of the publick, to the
latter the former must be the devoted sacrifice.” James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in 2 THE WORKS OF THE
HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 438–39 (Bird Wilson ed., 1804); see also Alexander Hamilton, A Letter from
Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New York (Jan. 1–27, 1784), in 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 106, at 483, 483–97 (equating abrogation of “allegiance” to one’s country with
“devot[ion] . . . to a foreign jurisdiction”).
123. For a discussion of the influence of classical idea of the viva activa of a citizen on early modern
citizenship discourse, see WELLS, supra note 51, at 1–9; Wood, supra note 94, at 23 (the classical “virtue” of
the “citizen” required “sacrifice [of] . . . private interests for the sake of the community” and “active”
participation in the political life of the state).
124. Wood, supra note 94, at 30.
125. Id. at 31 (“[The] new modern [republican] virtue was associated with affability and sociability, with
love and benevolence, indeed, with a new emphasis on politeness, which James Wilson and his friend William
White defined in 1768 as ‘the natural and graceful expression of the social virtues.’”) (quoting Stephen A.
Conrad, Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson’s Republican Theory, 1984 SUP.
CT. REV. 359, 361 (1984)); id. at 30 (“These natural affinities, the love and benevolence that men felt toward
each other, were akin to traditional classical republican virtue” of ancient “citizens” but “not identical to it.”);
see also WOOD, supra note 105, at 12 (noting that in revolutionary American thought, “[v]irtue became less the
harsh and martial self-sacrifice of antiquity and more the modern willingness to get along with others for the
sake of peace and prosperity”).
126. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (emphasis added);
see also SINOPOLI, supra note 105, at 102 (“Madison and Hamilton contend that the requisite civic dispositions,
the sentiments and habits needed to sustain a liberal polity, are reasonably likely to develop under the proposed
constitutional government. . . . [I]n time, the sentiments of allegiance, which at present principally accrued to
state governments, would be transferred, in some degree, to the national one” thanks to “the soundness and
durability” of national administration); PICKUS, supra note 80, at 38 (“[Hamilton] sought to foster a national
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2. Corroborating Corpus Evidence
The forgoing examples suggest “citizen” conveyed a normative
expectation of affective attachment to a body politic, limiting the term to the
only class of objects that possess the capacity for such attachment, natural
persons.
We employed two methods to corroborate this claim. First, using Brigham
Young University’s Corpus of Founding Era American English (“COFEA”)
database, we looked for adjectives that collocate to the left of citizen, since these
are likely to modify citizen and thus suggest qualities or attributes associated
with citizenship.127 When we ran such test, and excluded adjectives indicating
nationality (like American), the top adjectives that collocate, in a statistically
significant fashion, within four words to the left of citizen, include: Naturalborn, naturalized, virtuous, privileged, meritorious, patriotic, reputable,
illustrious, respectable, native, wealthy, private, dutiful, industrious, honest,
peaceable, ambitious, zealous, obscure, deserving, worthy, free, valuable,
modest, and benevolent.
Of these, several—valuable, useful, patriotic, and zealous—are suggestive
of the affective or virtue-oriented concept of citizenship. A number of these
words—virtuous, honest, patriotic, zealous—are modifiers for human beings.
And some of these terms, like patriotic and zealous, collocate with the words
“sentiments” or “attachment.”128
We then turned to look at the keywords “virtuous” and “citizen” in context
to see if that context reveals what normative expectations, exactly, were
associated with citizenship. Here, though, we found the overwhelming majority
of KWIC concordance lines were indeterminate. Of two hundred randomly
concordance lines, only a little over one-sixth (or thirty-five) of these provided
context that allowed a reasonable inference of the “virtue” of a citizen. Of, these,
in twenty (or slightly more than half the time) the speaker associated the “virtue”
of a citizen with zeal, patriotism, attachment, or affection toward a political
community. The remainder associated the citizen’s virtue with being
“dispassionate”—in the older sense of other- or public-regarding, as opposed to
self-interested—sobriety, courage, or industriousness.
This is all certainly suggestive. But what this evidence also indicates is that

sentiment that supported the Constitution, and less strongly the government in power . . . . For Hamilton, the
success of the government depended on its capacity to work its way into the daily sensibilities of the citizenry.”).
Hamilton’s stated aim echoes Vattel’s advice to statesmen. See 1 VATTEL, supra note 99, § 119, at 52 (arguing
that the great goal of statecraft is “to inspire the citizens with an ardent love for their country”). The link between
allegiance, sentiment, and citizenship in eighteenth century discourse, we note, did not go unnoticed by later
observers. In State ex rel. M’Cready v. Hunt, 2 Hill 1, 209–82 (S.C. App. L. & Eq. 1834), a case that arose out
of the Nullification Crisis, Justice O’Neill, on a lengthy disquisition on the origins and history of the link between
allegiance and citizenship, grudgingly conceded that “[i]n common discourse, perhaps, there has been some
vague notion of a feeling or sentiment connected with this term.” Id. at 278.
127. We ran a search for collocate “*/adj” within four words to the left of “citizen*/n” and set minimum
frequency to five. We ranked outcomes based on the mutual information score and discarded outcomes with a
mutual information score of less than 3.0.
128. Patriotic is one of the top twenty collocates of sentiments, with a mutual information score of 4.17.
Attachment is one of the top twenty collocates of zealous, with a mutual information score of 5.36.
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citizenship presupposed a rich set of normative content that writers assumed
“citizen,” by itself, conveyed. The authors accordingly didn’t always feel the
need to make that content explicit—the word itself could convey normative
content without needing to spell them out in surrounding text. The result, though,
is that simple collocation and KWIC analysis are suggestive, but hardly decisive,
windows into the presuppositions that sentences using “citizen” conveyed.
A different approach is taking an immersive deep dive into use of “citizen”
by reading widely in the period. This is a difficult and time-consuming
undertaking, but one plausible way to make this tractable is to identify a body of
representative texts that are particularly likely, on a closer examination, to reveal
the normative presuppositions that ordinary users of the English language would
pick up.
Our solution is to turn to literary sources of the period, collected in Gale’s
Eighteenth Century Online (“ECCO”) Literature and Language database. We do
so for a counterintuitive reason: “Citizen” appears in a large number of works in
this database across the 1770s and 1780s; but in a given work, it was used
sparingly—the works we reviewed used the term only a couple of times in a
volume. That’s actually useful: When used infrequently in a work, the term,
when it appears, was used with intention—because its normative or descriptive
content reinforced the themes of the passage it occurs in. As a result, literary
sources are a valuable window into the presupposed content of citizen.
We examined works in ECCO published in four periods: 1770–71, 1778–
80, 1786–87, and 1789. In all, we examined 249 uses across 158 works. Of these,
52 uses, or 20%, appeared in contexts that did not shed light on the normative
presuppositions that “citizen” conveyed. (These contexts often involved the use
of “citizen” when distinguishing between the geographic origins of two
characters. For example, an author would employ “citizen” to communicate
someone was a “native” of a different place (most frequently a city) than another
character.)
The remaining uses fell into five categories. In the first, citizen was chosen
as a descriptor of someone who might also be termed a “burgomeister” or a
“bourgeois”—a propertied man of status who lives in a city (generally of
London) and is associated with commercial trades. This use of the term traded
on its ancient use of “citizen” to mean a freeholder of a medieval city.129
Second, citizen was used in passages in which the character or person so
described was presented as a proper object of an expectation of loyalty,
affection, or patriotic attachment to his or her polity.
Third, citizen appeared in passages conveying that someone possessed
certain other virtues. For example, citizen was used in passages describing the
status-holder as sober or respectable or “useful” member of society, signaling
that citizen was associated with an expectation of performing civic, publicregarding duties.
129. Koessler, supra note 92, at 60 (discussing this medieval sense of the term, as an inhabitant of a city or
town free from feudal obligations).
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Fourth, citizen also appeared in passages emphasizing someone was an
enjoyer of rights or privileges of a free man, thus indicating an association of
citizen with liberties or legal privilege.
Finally, citizen was used in passages relating to the relative rank or status
of different persons. Thus, a passage might distinguish a noble from the
“common mass of citizens.” Or the term citizen would be used in a passage that
emphasizes that someone was, by virtue of their citizenship, worthy of or due
respect.
Of these, one set of uses—to mean a “burgomeister” or propertied urban
dweller—is plainly different from the term “citizen” used in Article III. When
that use (which appeared 19% of the time) is excluded from the ECCO data set,
thereby limiting the set to uses relating to a member of a republic rather than a
city, uses linking citizenship and civic virtue amounted to a little over threequarters of the remaining non-neutral uses. Across all uses indicating the
“virtue” of a citizen, though, nearly two-thirds of these appeared in contexts
emphasizing citizens were expected to have an affective attachment to their
community. In all, uses that communicated an expectation of affective
attachment to a community were the most common of all non-neutral uses
relating to a member of a republic—appearing with twice the frequency of the
next most common use.130
The evidence also tends to suggest authors viewed each of the senses
relating to a member of a republic—senses communicating an expectation of
affective attachment, expectations of other civic virtues, and enjoyment of
privileges or generic status—as complementary or related. For example, in
works that used the term in more than one sense (about 20% of the works in our
data set), every work that used the term to connote enjoyment of privileges also
used the term to signify affective attachment to a community. Similarly, in works
that used the term in more than one sense, 90% of works that used the term at
least once to connote civic virtue other than affective attachment also used the
term in an affective sense. The fact it was relatively common for the same author
to employ these senses together in a single work tends to suggest authors
understood the word to convey, simultaneously, each of these meanings.
“Citizen,” when used in relation to a member of a republic, signified an enjoyer
of status and rights, who was the subject of a reciprocal expectation of public
virtue and social attachment to the right-granting political community.
These findings are consistent with the tentative evidence of concordancebased analysis. And together with the pattern of usage of the framers and other
public figures in the 1780s and 1790s, it gives rise to a solid inference: that in
common parlance, “citizen,” particularly when used as a term a member of a

130. After excluding neutral uses and uses in the sense of burgomeister from the set, we were left with a set
of 150 uses in 97 works. In this set, uses indicating an expectation of affective attachment appeared half the time
and at least once in 61% of all remaining works. By contrast, uses conveying an expectation of other virtues
appeared 26.5% of the time and at least once in 31% of remaining works; uses communicating the right–
conferring nature of citizenship appeared 12.7% of the time and at least once in 17.5% of remaining works; and
uses conveying relative status appeared 11% of the time and at least once in 15.4% of remaking works.
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republic rather than city, conveyed a normative expectation of an affective tie to
a concrete society or political community. It was a tie of “citizens” that Englishspeakers, in the 1770s and 1780s, hadn’t assigned a commonly accepted label or
linguistic formula—but it was nonetheless a core part of the semantic content of
“citizen.”
3. “Negative Evidence”
Up to this point, the evidence we’ve offered is positive—evidence of the
concept that the citizenship positively conveyed. It was a term that conveyed an
aspirational expectation of affective attachment to a community or its creedal
values. Because it was a term defined in relation to the capacity for forming
complex social ties, its meaning contained a sortal restriction that limited the
term to natural persons.
A last line evidence is negative—contemporaneous statements about what
citizenship in 1787 is not. Reviewing evidence that the term was not applied to
certain objects or categories is essential. Terms can sometimes attract a tradition
of figurative usage. The word “kill” is a verb whose root object is an animate
object, something that can “live” and “die.” However, we frequently use the term
in relation to inanimate objects—we might say that a flaw in an electrical system
“killed” (shorted out) an electrical appliance. Thanks to this tradition, “kill” is
ambiguous—it can potentially apply not just to animate objects but inanimate
ones, as well. As a result, we have to disambiguate the word by looking at the
context in which the word is used.
This raises the question whether “citizen” might have been like that—a
word that had, in 1787, developed a tradition of figurative application to
inanimate or abstract objects.131 As a result, inquiring whether the term was used
other than in its literal sense is an important part of our larger inquiry. That
evidence can both correlate our claims about its literal meaning and eliminate,
at the same time, the possibility the term had developed a tradition of figurative
or metaphorical usage.
One context in which speakers may have had occasion to consider applying
“citizen” to inanimate or abstract objects involved the relation of the term to
corporations. Corporations were sometimes conceived of a “thing” or
“franchise,” which shareholders “owned.”132 They were simultaneously
reified—that is, treated in law as if they were a real “person.”133
The corporation, in the eighteenth century, was even sometimes the object
of terms that had accreted a tradition of figurative use—like the term
“inhabitant,” meaning an ordinary domiciliary. A corporation was thus an

131. For a discussion of “abstract objects” in the philosophy of language, see Grandy, supra note 31 (noting
a corporation or a “government” is an “abstract object,” and discussing debates in the philosophy of language
about the status of such objects).
132. 2 KENT, supra note 92, at 267 (“A corporation is a franchise possessed by one or more individuals, who
subsist as a body politic . . . .”).
133. Id. (the corporate “body politic” is an “invisible and intangible being” that is “vested, by the policy of
the law, with the capacity . . . of acting, in several respects . . . as a single individual”).
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“inhabitant” of a place it owned land and conducted its affairs.134 And, as a
result, if we were attempting to divine the original meaning of a text employing
“inhabitant,” we would have to investigate whether the term was used in a sense
that conveyed a literal or figurative meaning before excluding the possibility the
term embraced corporations.
We can find no evidence, however, that citizen was used figuratively to
describe corporations. In Calvin’s Case, Coke defined subjects as persons owing
allegiance—and specified that allegiance was a commitment that can only be
given by a “natural bodie,” that is, someone with a “soul.”135 Corporations, said
Coke just a few years later in the Case of Sutton’s Hospital, “had no souls,” and
therefore “could not commit treason.”136 The plain implication was that
corporations were not “subjects.”
Fast-forward to the 1780s and early 1790s, and the seventeenth-century
refusal to recognize corporations as an object of state membership-related terms,
like alien or subject, persisted. Thus, in his debate with Alexander Hamilton over
the first national bank, Thomas Jefferson objected that corporations allow
foreigners to evade restrictions on alien ownership of property.137 Hamilton
responded by appealing to ordinary meaning of the “law of alienage”—meaning
the law comprehensively governing not just the status and rights of aliens, but
the law of subjecthood and citizenship.138 That law “does not apply to
corporations,” he said, because “they have no country.”139
In this, Hamilton was largely talking past Jefferson. Jefferson did not
disagree—he wasn’t claiming corporations with alien shareholders were
“aliens.” Rather, he was making a practical point that “alien subscribers” can
evade restrictions on alien property ownership through the device of the
corporation, precisely because the corporate person is not subject to the law of
alienage.140 In either case, both speakers assumed that only the natural persons
who form the corporation are appropriate recipients of terms dealing with
“alienage.”

134. Rex v. Gardner (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 977, 977 (K.B.) (“[C]orporations, having lands, may be rated, and
have been considered as inhabitants in respect of such lands.”); 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 697, 703 (1642) (stating that “every corporation and body politicke . . . having lands” are considered
inhabitants of such lands).
135. Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 385 (K.B.) (“[L]igeance, and faith and trust which are her
members and parts, are qualities of the mind and soul of man . . . .”); id. at 392 (the duty of allegiance is “written
with the finger of God in the heart of man”); EGERTON, supra note 88, at 101 (explaining that under Coke’s
reasoning, only a “natural bodie” can give allegiance).
136. The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (K.B.) (finding that corporations are
“invisible, immortal, and rest[] only in the intendment and consideration of the law . . . . They cannot commit
treason, nor be . . . outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they have no souls”).
137. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States (Feb. 15, 1791),
in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 91, 91 (Matthew St. Clair
Clark & David A. Hall eds., 1832).
138. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States (Feb. 23, 1791),
in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 137, at 95, 100.
139. Id.
140. Jefferson, supra note 137, at 91 (referring to “alien subscribers” of the national bank) (emphasis
added).
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Similarly, every major treatise after subdividing “persons” into “natural”
and “artificial” categories presented citizenship or alienage as statuses
applicable to natural persons while treating artificial persons, or corporations, as
a topic apart from the law of natural persons, including the law of alienage.141
Major eighteenth-century treatments of the law of corporations, like Stewart
Kyd’s Treatise on the Law of Corporations, also do not discuss the law of
subjecthood or citizenship—indicating their writers thought this area of law was
inapplicable to corporations.142
Treaties between the United States and foreign countries dealt with the
duties or rights of corporations apart from the rights of the contracting states’
citizens or subjects.143 Similarly, Americans and other English speakers, when
enumerating subjects of a law, would carefully distinguish “citizens” from
“corporations.”144
Of course, focusing simply on the application of “citizen” to corporations
may be missing important semantic evidence. Corporations in the eighteenth
century, after all, were conceptualized differently than modern corporations. As
Julian Ku notes, they were sometimes treated as something more akin to “arms
of the state”—in effect, a kind of quasi-governmental entity.145 One, however,
could imagine a pattern of figurative use of “citizen” applied to abstractions or
things that have been uniformly attributed to the qualities of private persons. If
so, it would be a term whose conventional usage would not apply to eighteenthcentury corporations, which were often viewed as quasi-governmental entities,
141. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *354–63 (treating of the laws of alienage); id. at *455–73
(treating artificial persons, after noting that the treatise’s previous sections, including alienage statuses,
“considered persons in their natural capacities”). This tradition persisted long after the Supreme Court began
referring to corporations as citizens of states for certain purposes in the antebellum period. See 1 BOUVIER, supra
note 36, at 57–84 (dividing persons into natural and artificial persons, and then treating statuses of citizen,
subject, and alien as statuses of natural persons); 2 KENT, supra note 92, at 267–316 (treating corporations under
the heading “rights of persons,” but treating corporations separately from natural persons, and confining
discussion of alienage statuses to natural persons only).
142. 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, at vii–xiv (1793) (table of contents).
143. Julian G. Ku, The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 729, 739
(2012) (collecting authorities); see also Marcantel, supra note 38, at 239–41 (collecting structural evidence from
some early state constitutions suggesting a distinction between citizens and corporations).
144. See, e.g., 1 KYD, supra note 142, passim (using “citizen” only in relation to members of a corporation—
usually a municipal corporation, consistent with the term’s older sense of a freeman of a city—never to the
corporation itself).
145. Ku, supra note 143, at 738 (“[T]he modern corporation probably traces its origin back only to the midnineteenth century. Earlier corporations, such as those [meant] . . . to carry out state monopolies . . . were special
dispensations from the government . . . . In some ways, those corporations were understood to simply be
privately financed arms of the state.”); id. at 739 (as a result, in treaties in the early nineteenth century and late
eighteenth century, “[c]orporations were not . . . typically considered nationals needing protection, but more like
agents acting on behalf of or under state authority”); WINKLER, supra note 38, at 48 (“In Blackstone’s
day, . . . corporations more clearly straddled the divide between public and private. They had unambiguously
private aspects, in that they were financed and managed by private parties. Yet they were also inherently public.
They could only be formed by charter granted by the government, and the government would not grant one
unless the corporation had a public purpose. . . . Corporations had to serve the commonweal . . . .”); Gregory A.
Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441,
1443–47, 1452–53, 1482 (1987) (discussing the early concept of the corporation as a “derivative tool of the
state”); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 1780-1790, at 17 (1970) (“From the 1780’s well into the mid-nineteenth century the most frequent and
conspicuous use of the business corporation . . . was for one particular type of enterprise, that which we later
called the public utility . . . .”).
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but would embrace the modern corporation, which is pervasively described as a
wholly private “person.”146
However, of the 249 uses of “citizen” we reviewed on ECCO, we could not
find a single instance applying the term figuratively to any abstract objects or
non-human objects. Outside of ECCO, the only figurative use from the framing
period that we have identified is Judith Sergeant Murray’s characterization of
“philanthropy” as a “citizen of the world,” discussed earlier.147 Otherwise, every
use in which the identity of the term’s referent could be unambiguously
ascertained used “citizen” in relation to a specific natural person or individual
members of a group of natural persons.148
The evidence, in other words, suggests popular usage of “citizen” was
confined to its literal sense: a status reserved for animate objects capable of
forming complex social ties or sentiments, namely human beings.
C. ELIMINATING A COMPETING SENSE OF “CITIZEN”
The previous Subparts showed that citizen’s 1787 meaning included a
sortal restriction limiting the term to persons with capacity for social ties, or
natural persons. After ratification, American courts articulated another meaning
of a state “citizen”—not as a status entitling one to privileges and immunities
under the domestic law of a given state, but as a term for a person who, simply,
“belongs” to a state in the eyes of international law by virtue of subjection to
what we would term the state’s “general jurisdiction.”
This sense is less restrictive—because its sorting criteria is, simply,
“subjection to the general jurisdiction of a state,” it can encompass any objects,
including artificial persons, which, while lacking sentiments, happen to satisfy
the requirements for exercise of “general jurisdiction.” As such, it would do no
damage to this sense of the term to extend it to modern corporations, which are,
of course, proper objects of the law of general jurisdiction.
In this Subpart, we complete the picture by showing that this use developed
in America only after ratification (and even then it remained an obscure
specialist sense). The historical and collocation evidence above itself, indeed,
tends to demonstrate this—in the 1780s, citizen was pervasively described in
terms of affective or solidaristic, not just territorial, ties. And, thus, the word
collocated most strongly with terms that were consistent with having either
public virtue or a tie or affection to a community, rather than terms that describe
146. Mark, supra note 145, at 1447; id. at 1442–47 (tracing the emergence, after the rise of general
incorporation statutes, of “the conception of the corporation as a real person, which saw the corporation as an
autonomous, self–directed entity in which rights inhered”); id. at 1464–83 (discussing the post–realist “rhetorical
convention” of describing the corporation as such).
147. See MURRAY, supra note 121, at 149.
148. In the ECCO database, we coded all uses that associated citizenship with affective attachment to a
community as uses of the term to refer to natural persons. We coded other uses as references to natural persons
when the passage in which the word appeared either (1) used the term in relation to a specific person or persons,
or (2) described the “citizens” at issue as having attributes that could only belong to human beings, including
ethnicity, physical characteristics (“hearts” or “blood,” for example), ancestry or progeny, or emotional states.
Twenty percent of the uses in the ECCO database were too generic to support any conclusion about the identity
of the class of referents.
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a simple jurisdictionally relevant relationship.
Below, Subpart C.1 fills in the picture further, by tracing the somewhat
unexpected source of the alternative concept of state citizen from a postratification line of prize and capture cases in the British Admiralty at the turn of
the nineteenth century. As such, this new concept of citizen is not part of the
term’s pre-ratification public meaning.149
This is not to say that “citizen,” in 1787, had no relationship to the
territorial contacts we, today, associate with general jurisdiction. Territorial
contacts, we show in Subpart C.2, were legally relevant because they served as
a proxy for assessing whether a candidate for “citizenship” had formed the
requisite social “attachments” that were citizenship’s prerequisite. As a result,
the territorial contacts that mattered to citizenship reflected, and were cabined
by, the fact that “citizen” was a status restricted to natural persons.
1. The Post-Ratification Rise of “Domiciliary Citizenship” in Antebellum
International Law
In the eighteenth century, courts commonly adjudicated concepts of
citizenship or subjecthood in “prize and capture” cases. During declared wars,
states licensed private ships, or “privateers,” to confiscate the goods of the
enemy. But, in some cases, victims of confiscation disputed whether their
property was a proper target of privateering, which reached only the goods with
a “hostile” or enemy “character.”150
In England, courts held that the “enemy character will attach to a subject
or neutral who carries on business in the enemy’s country.”151 However, writes
William Holdsworth, this principle was not established “as a definite legal
principle” until a series of cases authored by Sir William Scott for the British
High Court of Admiralty in the late 1790s.152
In The Vigilantia,153 decided in 1798, Scott held someone domiciled in a
foreign state for purposes of trade, even if not a naturalized “subject” of that
state, was “stamped with the national character” of that state in the eyes of
international law and therefore a “subject” of that state under the laws of prize

149. In Great Britain, there was a separate tradition, dating back to the Middle Ages, of using the term citizen
as term for a freeman of a city or town located within a state, as opposed to a member of a state; this was a use
(because the status of freemen was awarded based on guild membership) that was also associated with
tradesmen. Johnson’s Dictionary defined these as the exclusive sense of the word in British English in early
editions. In the 1785 edition, he suggested it had expanded to encompass not just freemen, but all inhabitants of
cities and towns. See 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785) (adding, for
the first time, “inhabitant; dweller of any place” as a sense of citizen, in addition to “freeman of a city” or “man
of trade”). We find no evidence this line of usage contributed to the popular or technical meaning of “state”
citizens in America during or after the framing period.
150. The Venus, 12 U.S. 253, 278–80 (1814).
151. 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 101 (1926). Holdsworth traces the evolution
of the principle back to precursors in 1677, but notes that it was established only “as a definite legal principle”
at the end of the eighteenth century. See id. at 101 n.2.
152. Id.
153. The Vigilantia (1798) 165 Eng. Rep. 74, 79 (Adm.); see also The Indian Chief (1801) 165 Eng. Rep.
367, 371 (Adm.) (holding the “national character” of a trading domicile is “adventitious” and easily reverts,
upon the merchant’s departure with intent to return to his native country).
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and war, subjecting their property to lawful confiscation like any other subject
of an enemy power.154
Scott’s decision was a workaround a settled piece of English law of
subjecthood. Common law allegiance was perpetual—thus, British domiciliaries
in foreign countries remained “subjects” of their native land.155 Yet, if English
domiciliaries in enemy foreign countries remained British subjects, their
property was not the property of an “enemy” and thus not subject to confiscation
during wartime. The concept of an acquired “national character” through a
permanent trading domicile abroad created a workaround. It created a form of
quasi-expatriation for purposes of the law of prize and capture.
The doctrine of perpetual allegiance, James Kettner notes, clashed with
Americans’ embrace, during the American Revolution, of citizenship acquired
through “volitional [change in] allegiance.”156 Even so, American courts
remained uncertain about the continued vitality of the common law doctrine, at
least on the international plane.157
As a result, the concept of foreign citizenship by domicile for purposes of
prize and capture had the same utility for antebellum American courts that it had
for their English counterparts. It allowed Americans to reach results consistent
with the right of expatriation without formally resolving whether expatriation
was possible outside of a revolutionary context.158
Thus, in The Venus,159 a case involving a challenge to a licensed American
privateer’s confiscation of goods of naturalized American citizens who were
living for trading purposes in Great Britain during the War of 1812,160 Justice
Washington relied on The Vigilantia and its progeny to hold that an American
domiciled for trading purposes in an enemy state, “while not an enemy, in the
154. The Vigilantia, 165 Eng. Rep. at 79.
155. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *357 (stating that a subject’s natural allegiance is “a debt of gratitude,
which cannot be forfeited, canceled, or altered, by any change of time, place, or circumstance”). Even
Englishmen naturalized in a foreign country were understood to retain a native allegiance to Great Britain. Id. at
*358.
156. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 268 (“The claim that every man had the right to slough off his allegiance
and to discard his citizenship was a direct extrapolation and generalization of the right of election affirmed during
the Revolution.”); see also 2 WILLIAM B LACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF
THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 96 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803) (“[T]he whole
that we have seen, it appears, that the right of emigration is a right strictly natural; and that the restraints which
may be imposed upon the exercise of it, are merely creatures of the juris positivi, or municipal laws of a state.
And consequently that wherever the laws of any country do not prohibit, they permit emigration, or, as I rather
chuse to call it, expatriation.”).
157. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 271 (“Some judges showed great reluctance to diverge too widely from the
old English notion of perpetual allegiance . . . .”). 2 KENT, supra note 92, at 42 (noting uncertainty about the
right of expatriation on the international plane, and concluding that “the better opinion would seem to be, that a
citizen cannot renounce his allegiance to the United States without the permission of government, to be declared
by law; and that, as there is no existing legislative regulation on the case, the rule of the English common law
remains unaltered”).
158. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 276 (“Not surprisingly, both state and federal courts frequently preferred
to evade adjudicating the question of expatriation instead of confronting it squarely; alternative legal doctrines
were available that often allowed the courts to sidestep citizenship questions. Perhaps most useful was the tenet
that residence or domicil could establish a person’s ‘national character’ for certain purposes . . . .”).
159. See The Venus, 12 U.S. 253 (1814).
160. Id. at 276.
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strict sense of the word,” was nonetheless “stamp[ed] . . . with the national
character of the state where he resides,” becoming “a citizen of an inferior order”
of that state.161 The United States, accordingly, may “seize of so much of his
property as is concerned in the trade of the enemy.”162
Justice Washington, however, went one step further than Scott, by linking
The Vigilantia to a passage from Vattel’s Law of Nations.163 There, Vattel
defined “[t]he inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens” to be “foreigners, who
are permitted to settle and stay in the country.”164 However, said Vattel,
“The perpetual inhabitants are those who have received the right of perpetual
residence. These are a kind of citizens of an inferior order, and are united to the
society, without participating in all its advantages.”165 The Venus equated
Vattel’s concept of “perpetual inhabitants,” who are “citizens of an inferior
order,” with Scott’s concept of acquisition of “national character” by
domicile.166
This may be a misreading of Vattel. Vattel used “inhabitant” to refer to
someone residing in the state for an indefinite period, the modern test for
domicile.167 By contrast, by “perpetual inhabitants” or “citizens of an inferior
order,” Vattel appeared to be thinking of beneficiaries of something akin to the
English legal process of “denization,”168 through which aliens and their progeny
were granted a legal right of perpetual settlement (but not full rights of state
membership) by a royal or some other positive legal grant.169
161. Id. at 279.
162. Id. at 279–80.
163. Id. at 278 (“The doctrine of the prize Courts, as well as of the Courts of common law, in England, . . . is
the same with what is stated by [Vattel]; except that it is less general, and confines the consequences resulting
from this acquired character to the property of those persons engaged in the commerce of the country in which
they reside.”).
164. 1 VATTEL, supra note 99, § 213, at 92.
165. Id.
166. The Venus, 12 U.S. at 278–79.
167. Thus, in a later section, he distinguishes inhabitants from sojourners, those who are temporarily in the
territory of the state for a defined amount of time. 2 VATTEL, supra note 99, § 99, at 153 (distinguishing the
“inhabitants” from the strangers “who pass or sojourn in a country” for the management of their affairs).
168. Denizens were alien domiciliaries—persons who had taken up a residence with an animus manendi
(with an intention to remain)¾who, along with their progeny, received by an act of positive law permanent
protection from the sovereigns’ right to remove aliens. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *362. They owed, in
turn, a perpetual allegiance. 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDWARD COKE 170
(Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (characterizing the allegiance of a denizen as “ligentia acquisita” or an “acquired
allegiance,” the same type of allegiance of naturalized subjects). Denizens were therefore often termed
“subjects” in English law, although subjects of an inferior order to naturalized subjects. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 36, at *362.
169. See 1 VATTEL, supra note 99, § 213, at 92 (defining perpetual inhabitants as those “who have received
the right of perpetual residence” (emphasis added)). Chief Justice Marshall seemed to interpret this passage in a
similarly restrictive fashion. See The Venus, 12 U.S. at 289–91 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting Vattel defined
a “perpetual inhabitant” as someone with the intention of “staying always”; and then noting “[t]he right of the
citizens or subjects of one country to remain in another, depends on the will of the sovereign”; thus, “[i]f the
stranger has not the power of making his residence perpetual, . . . . an intention always to stay there ought not, I
think, to be fixed” without evidence the domiciliary has been “specially permitted to stay” by the host sovereign).
Gordon Sherman argued that Vattel’s concept of perpetual inhabitants had in mind the Swiss Einwohner,
permanent legal residents granted the right of perpetual residence, who lacked full political rights. Sherman notes
that the Einwohner were “truly . . . citizen[s] ‘in the sense of the constitution, merely lacking eligibility for public
office,’” which was reserved to the Swiss patrician families. See Gordan E. Sherman, Emancipation and
Citizenship, 15 YALE L.J. 263, 276 n.37 (1906). The German international law theorist Christian Wolff (a major
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Regardless, The Venus not only suggested the prize law doctrine of
“citizenship” was acquired by what amounts to an ordinary modern domicile—
a mere intent to reside somewhere indefinitely—but it articulated this as a
general principle of international law, one that swept well beyond the context of
capture during time of war.170
In the wake of The Venus and similar cases in the first two decades in the
early nineteenth century, American international law treatises like Joseph
Story’s Conflict of Laws and Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law,
would characterize the doctrine of international law “citizenship” similarly.171
And in 1853, the State Department made this the official doctrine of the United
States in the so-called Kostza Affair, a dispute over Austria’s seizure and
imprisonment of a refugee, Martin Koszta, domiciled in America who had not
yet become a naturalized American citizen.
In the process, the Secretary of State made explicit an idea that was,
arguably, implicit in The Vigilantia. Domicile, Scott had said, “stamped” or
“impressed” the domiciliary with the national character of his chosen home in
the eyes of prize law.172 The metaphor of “stamping” or “impressing” a character
suggested that the status of citizen is not acquired voluntarily, but is simply a
label for someone who “belongs” to the state by virtue of being subject to the
state’s unalloyed territorial power.173
Secretary of State Marcy seized on this implication to justify American
influence on Vattel), by contrast, did classify all alien visitors, even those sojourning in the country for a limited
time, as “temporary citizens.” 2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM [THE
LAW OF NATIONS TREATED ACCORDING TO A SCIENTIFIC METHOD ] §§ 303–04 (Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934)
(1764) (“[F]oreigners, as long as they dwell in alien territory or stay there, are temporary citizens. For when they
enter an alien territory they tacitly bind themselves that they wish to subject their acts to the laws of the place,
and the laws have the same force over them as over citizens.”). His view was, however, was an outlier among
eighteenth century international law writers, and we can find no evidence that it had an impact on American
conceptions of citizenship. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 12 (1996) (alluding to the fact that Wolff’s definition of “citizen” was
broader than other theorists).
170. The Venus, 12 U.S. at 278 (characterizing the British prize cases as consistent the general principle of
international law, but noting that the British cases operate a “less general” manner confined to prize and capture
during wartime).
171. For example, in his 1834 treatise Conflict of Laws, Joseph Story declared that while “[p]ersons who
are born in a country are generally deemed to be citizens and subjects of that country,” citizens who establish a
domicile in foreign country “acquire[]” the “national character” of that country. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES § 48,
at 47–49 (Boston, Hillard Gray & Co. 1834) (citing The Venus, Vattel, and the admiralty decisions by Sir Walter
Scott) (discussing the principles of “public law” of “unquestioned authority” relating to domicil in foreign
countries). However, citing Scott’s decision in The Indian Chief, Story noted the party “reacquires” the character
of his native domicil when “has left the country animo non revertendi and is on his return to his ‘native country’.”
Id. The American Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law, published in 1836, also described these same
rules as a general principle of international law. 4 HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 319,
at 42 (London, B. Fellowes, Ludgate St. 1832) (“Whatever may be the extent of claims of a man’s native country
upon his political allegiance, there can be no doubt that the natural-born subject of one country may become the
citizen of another, in time of peace, for the purposes of trade” through establishing an “acquired domicil” there).
172. The Vigilantia (1798) 165 Eng. Rep. 74, 79 (Adm.).
173. Koessler, supra note 92, at 62–63 (discussing this concept and noting modern usage calls it
“nationality,” while alluding to earlier use of the term “citizen” to convey the same idea); Dudley O. McGovney,
American Citizenship, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 235–36, 258–59 (1911) (similarly defining “nationality” as the
status of “belonging” to a state, and noting that in its broadest sense it embraces persons who have a simple
domicile in a state, while arguing the term should be understood in a narrower sense).
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assertion of authority of Kostza, a non-citizen. International law, wrote Secretary
Marcy, “has clear and distinct rules of its own,” independent of “municipal
codes.”174 “Foreigners may, and often do, acquire a domicil in a country, even
though they have entered it with the avowed intention not to become naturalized
citizens[;] . . . and, wherever they acquire a domicil, international law at once
impresses upon them the national character of the country of that
domicil. . . . [I]t forces it upon him often very much against his will . . . .”175 This
impressed “national character” Marcy called “nationality,” and he argued it
enjoins other countries to respect the American domiciliary “as an American
citizen.”176 Contemporaneous (and later) commentators noted the Secretary of
State’s debt to the turn-of-the-century prize cases.177
Then, just a few years later, in 1858, the abolitionist lawyer John Codman
Hurd, in his magisterial treatise The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United
States would explicitly connect Article III citizenship to “international law,”
while articulating that law in ways reminiscent of the State Department in the
Koszta Affair: In Article III, he would argue, “persons are . . . called citizens in
reference to that element in the definition of citizen which ordinarily determines
questions of personal jurisdiction in the application of international private law,
and . . . has no reference to the civil or political liberty, (privileges and
immunities of legal persons,) but simply to their quality of being legal persons,
domiciled in this or that forum of jurisdiction.”178
2. The Distinct Role of Domicile in the Framing Era Law of Citizenship
This concept of state “citizenship”—as a “legal person” subject to the
general “personal jurisdiction” of a state179—is essentially the concept of Article
III citizenship articulated, in so many words, in the modern law of federal
174. Mr. Marcy to Mr. Hulsemann (Sept. 26, 1853), in CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF
STATE AND THE CHARGE D’AFFAIRES OF AUSTRIA RELATIVE TO THE CASE OF M ARTIN KOSZTA 18 (U.S. Dep’t
of State trans., 1853).
175. Id.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id. In 1858, English international law scholar John Westlake would criticize the Secretary of State for
over-generalizing from Scott’s capture cases. Westlake argued instead these cases should be confined to the
narrow context of property rights in a declared war. JOHN WESTLAKE, A TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW, OR THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 49–50 (London, W. Maxwell 1858) (noting in the course of discussing the
Hulsemann Letter that while it “may require that the protection enjoyed in time of war by property . . . shall be
founded on domicile,” it is “scarcely” the case that “one whose avowed intention it was not to be naturalized
should . . . be treated as naturalized when beyond the territory” in other contexts); see also McGovney, supra
note 173, at 249 (“So far as Secretary Marcy based Kostza’s alleged ‘national character’ upon his domicil in the
United States he was applying rules applicable to the entirely different matter of the quasi-nationality recognized
in prize law . . . .”).
178. 1 JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 372, at 436
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1858). It would take a century for writers to distinguish the two concepts of
citizenship, by reserving the word “national” (the term alternatively suggested by Secretary Marcy) for the status
of “belonging to a state” in the eyes of international law, while reserving the term “citizen” for a person entitled
to municipal rights and privileges under domestic law. See Koessler, supra note 92, at 62–63 (“‘Citizenship,’ in
modern usage, is not a synonym of nationality or a term generally used for the status of belonging to a state”;
“the trend is to reserve the term ‘national’ for the designation of that status by virtue of which a person,
internationally, belongs to a certain state, and to speak of ‘citizenship’ when the local status referred to is one of
domestic rather than international law”).
179. HURD, supra note 178, at 436.
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jurisdiction that gradually emerged in the twentieth century. It can, obviously,
embrace modern corporations as well as natural persons. Corporations, qua
corporations, don’t have sentiments or emotional attachments, but modern
corporations can form the type of territorial connections that subject them to a
state’s general “jurisdiction.”180
As a result, if “citizen” is simply a term for persons conceptualized as
having territorial ties that subject them to a state’s general “jurisdiction,” it is a
concept that can extend—as Hurd implied—to any “legal person,” including the
modern corporation.
Yet, this use of “citizen”¾as a term for “belonging” to a state in the eyes
of international law through simple subjection to a state’s general jurisdiction
through a “domicile”¾is simply not on display in popular American discourse
prior to 1800.
Typically, Americans used “inhabitant” to mean anyone domiciled in a
state, a sense that embraced both “citizens” and aliens who had not been
naturalized, including but not limited to formal “denizens” (a status whose
conferral an order-in-council “effectively halted” in the colonies after 1700, but
was revived by some states post-independence).181 Thus, said Delaware’s High
Court of Errors and Appeals in 1819, the term inhabitant “comprehends the
inhabitants generally, citizen and alien.”182
In Federalist 42, in the course of critiquing Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation (its “Comity Clause”), James Madison noted this was the more
common sense of “inhabitant.”183 The Articles’ “Comity Clause,” granted the
“privileges and immunities of free citizens of the several states” to the “free
inhabitants of each of these states.”184 And, complained Madison, “it seems to
be a construction scarcely avoidable . . . that those who come under the
denomination of FREE INHABITANTS of a State, although not citizens of such
State, are entitled, in every other State, to all the privileges of FREE CITIZENS
of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their
own State.”185 That construction was “scarcely avoidable” because “inhabitants”
ordinarily meant a simple “domiciliary,” a term that could embrace not only
180. The concept of corporations as “subject” to a state’s power is, indeed, hardly modern. Although
corporations were not called “subjects” in ordinary discourse, see supra notes 135–144, Thomas Hobbes
characterized them as such in De Cive, because they, along with “citizens,” are “subject of him who hath the
chief command.” HOBBES, supra note 92, ch. 5, §§ 10–11, at 170–71 (“companies of merchants,” “convents,”
and other corporate entities, which Hobbes calls “civil persons subordinate to the city,” are formed by the
“citizens” of the “city”; and they are called, along with the “citizens” who compose them, “the subject of him
who hath the chief command”).
181. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 95; Alexander Hamilton, Motion on Citizenship Requirement for
Membership in the House of Representatives (August 13, 1787), in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
1787-1788, at 234, 234 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962) (moving that the “section be so altered as to require merely
citizenship and inhabitancy”).
182. Douglass’ Adm’r v. Stevens, 2 Del. Cas. 489, 500 (1819). The distinction continued well into the
antebellum period. See Quinby v. Duncan, 4 Del. 383, 384 (Super. Ct. 1846) (“A man may be a citizen, without
being an inhabitant, of the State; as a man may be an inhabitant, without being a citizen. This is an obvious
distinction . . . .”).
183. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 277–78 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
184. Id.
185. Id.

November 2020]

ORIGINAL MEANING OF “CITIZENS”

211

citizens, but also non-citizens.
However, Madison also noted that “inhabitant” also might mean “citizen
alone”—meaning either a native or an alien who had been “naturaliz[ed].”186
And he noted if “such an exposition of the term ‘inhabitants’ were admitted” it
would solve many problems with the Comity Clause of the Articles of
Confederation. (And for precisely this reason, Madison explained, the
Constitution of 1787 adopted the substance of the Comity Clause, while
substituting “citizen” for “inhabitant.”)
The use of “inhabitants” to mean “citizens” was, as Madison suggested,
unusual—but it was far from unknown in ordinary discourse in the 1780s.
Americans sometimes treated “inhabitant “and “citizen” as interchangeable—
but they did so because domicile was one of the common prerequisites for state
“member”- or “citizen”-ship in the Articles period.
The reason for this linkage lay in the pre-ratification link between
citizenship and social ties or attachments unpacked earlier. To be a citizen was,
at a minimum, to be someone who was a proper object of an expectation of
affective attachment to a state. Domicile, in turn, was commonly considered one
relation between person and state that justified that expectation.
This view of the link between domicile and citizenship spanned both
revolutionary movements at the end of the eighteenth century, the American and
the French.
The French, in the Constitution of 1791, distinguished between passive and
active citizens. Passive citizens enjoyed equal civil rights, but could not vote or
hold office, while active citizens also held the elective franchise. As Charlotte
Wells writes, qualifying for the entry-level tier of “passive citizenship” in turn
required “the individual’s choice to be French as indicated by residence on
French soil,” a choice that signaled “loyalty to a community espousing
democratic and egalitarian ideals.”187
The idea that domicile indicated voluntary attachment to a state was
equally current in America. For example, Jefferson, writing in 1776 to Edmund
Pendleton, noted that he was “for extending the right of suffrage (or in other
words the rights of a citizen) to all who had a permanent intention of living in
the country.”188 “Take what circumstances you please as evidence of this,”
explained Jefferson, “either the having resided a certain time, or having a family,
186. Id.
187. WELLS, supra note 51, at 142. As Wells notes, the idea that domicile was essential to forming an
attachment to a community had deep roots in Western legal thought. See id. at 33 (discussing the influence, in
early modern France, of the fifteenth century view that “a change in domicile . . . could eventually alter the
inborn habitus of ancestral citizenship”).
188. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, Philadelphia, Aug. 26, 1776, YALE L. SCH.
LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. L IBRARY: THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/let9.asp (last
visited Nov. 23, 2020). Even those who argued for relaxing domicile or residence periods as test for citizenship
conceded that affective attachment was a criterion for citizenship. Instead, radicals of the period, like the Paineite Joel Barlow, contended that residency periods, or even domicile, were no longer necessary to secure
emigrants’ attachment to republican communities, because the spread of republican liberty would lead the
“citizens of one state [to] consider those of any other state as their brothers,” and so “a mere declaration of their
intention of residence will be sufficient to entitle them to all the rights that the natives possess.” See BARLOW,
supra note 106, at 36.
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or having property, any or all of them. Whoever intends to live in a country must
wish that country well, [and] has a natural right of assisting in the preservation
of it.”189
Consistent with the view that an intention of living in the state indicated
attachment to it, most American states, in addition to an oath of allegiance, either
required an intention to “settle,” “remain,” or establish a domicile in the state;190
or satisfaction of “a specific period of residence”191 as a prerequisite to become
a naturalized “citizen”192 during the Articles of Confederation period.193 As
189. Letter from Jefferson, supra note 188.
190. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 214–18; see also An Act for Preventing Improper or Disafected Persons,
supra note 117, at 162–66 (specifying that applicants for naturalization must have an “intent to remain” within
the state and demonstrate their “Attachment to the Liberties and Independence of the United States of America”);
N.J. HIST. RECS. PROGRAM, GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION RECORDS IN NEW JERSEY 3 (1941) (“[A]ll Inhabitants
of this Colony of full age who are worth fifty pounds, Proclamation money, clear Estate in the same, and have
resided within the county in which they claim a vote for 12 months immediately preceding the election, shall be
entitled to vote for representatives in council and assembly, and also for all other public officers that shall be
elected by the people of the county at large.” (quoting Act of July 2, 1776)); PA. CONST. of 1776 § 42, in 5 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 3081, 3091 (Francis Newton Thorpe, ed., 1909) (“Every foreigner of good
character who comes to settle in this state, having first taken an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the same,
may purchase, or by other just means acquire, hold, and transfer land or other real estate; and after one year’s
residence, shall be deemed a free denizen thereof, and entitled to all the rights of a natural born subject of this
state, except that he shall not be capable of being elected a representative until after two years residence.”); N.C.
CONST. of 1776, art. XL, in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2787, 2793–94 (“[E]very
foreigner, who comes to settle in this State, having first taken an oath of allegiance to the same, may purchase,
or, by other means, acquire, hold, and transfer land, or other real estate; and after one year’s residence, shall be
deemed a free citizen.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLII, in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra,
at 2623, 2637–38 (“[I]t shall be in the discretion of the legislature to naturalize all such persons, and in such
manner, as they shall think proper: Provided, All such of the persons so to be by them naturalized, as being born
in parts beyond sea, and out of the United States of America, shall come to settle in and become subjects of this
State, shall take an oath of allegiance to this State, and abjure and renounce all allegiance and subjection to all
and every foreign king, prince, potentate, and State in all matters, ecclesiastical as well as civil.”); VT. CONST.
of 1777, art. XLIII, § XXXVIII, in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, T ERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 3737, 3747–48 (Francis Newton Thorpe,
ed., 1909) (“Every foreigner of good character, who comes to settle in this State, having first taken an oath or
affirmation of allegiance to the same, may purchase, or by other just means acquire, hold, and transfer, land or
other real estate; and after one years residence, shall be deemed a free denizen thereof, and intitled to all the
rights of a natural born subject of this State; except that he shall not be capable of being elected a representative,
until after two years residence.”).
191. See Thomas Johnson, An Act for Naturalization, in 1 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND 362, 362–64 (Virgil
Maxcy, ed., 1811) (declaring the intention of the act of naturalization is to encourage foreigners to “settle” in
the state, but requiring only a declaration of “belief in the Christian religion” and an oath that the application
will be “faithful and bear true allegiance to the state” to naturalize foreigners, while also requiring residence for
a specified period of years to hold public office); An Act Declaring Who Shall Be Deemed Citizens of this
Commonwealth, in 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 129,
129–130 (William Waller Hening, ed., 1822) (providing “[t]hat all white persons born within the territory of this
commonwealth, and all who have resided therein two years next before the passing of this act; and all who shall
hereafter migrate into the same, other than alien enemies, and shall before any court of record, given satisfactory
proof by their own oath or affirmation that they intend to reside therein; and moreover shall give assurance of
fidelity to the commonwealth” are citizens).
192. Some states, like Pennsylvania, Vermont, and New York, used the traditional term subject, rather than
“citizen,” which became the preferred term for state membership only in the latter half of the 1780s. See
Koessler, supra note 92, at 58–59. In oral argument in Respublica v. Chapman, decided in 1781, the attorney
general of Pennsylvania interpreted the appellation to be synonymous with “citizen,” and Justice McKean treated
citizens and subjects as interchangeable terms. See Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. 53, 56 (1781) (comparing
Pennsylvania’s provisions to provisions relating to citizenship in other states). Authorities in other states treated
their reference to “subjects” similarly. Koessler, supra note 92, at 58–59.
193. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 218.
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Kettner explains,
The assumption underlying residence requirements was that the exercise of
political rights required a clear and conscious attachment to and familiarity
with republican principles. . . . [T]ime alone could insure that those imbued
with “foreign principles” had the opportunity to assimilate the habits, values,
and modes of thought necessary for responsible participation in a virtuous,
self-governing republican community.194

In most states, a continued inhabitance in the state after the Declaration of
Independence was also a requirement for citizenship of adult natives.195 The
reason lay with the common law rule in Calvin’s Case, which equated nativity
with subjection only to the sovereign under whose protection one was born.196
Thus, an adult born in the colony prior to the Revolution was not, by virtue of
that birth, a citizen in the newly independent states, since their sovereign
political authority did not exist at the time of his birth. In a revolutionary setting,
some new act demonstrating volitional “allegiance” or “attachment” to a newly
constituted body politic was therefore needed to naturalize adult natives of the
colonies.197 States settled on continued “residence” or “inhabitance” (or
maintaining a “domicile” in the state) as that act.198 And so, as the Supreme
Court would comment years later, “after the colonies had become the United
States, . . . their inhabitants [were] generally citizens of those States.”199
That led many Americans to use “inhabitant” and “citizen”
interchangeably. For example, in 1782 New York enacted a statute staying suits
for debts “by, or from any person nor within the enemies power or lines that has
remained with, gone into, or has in consequence of any of law this State been
sent within the enemies power.”200 The statute’s preamble characterized the
194. Id. at 218–19.
195. Id. at 183–84 (“[I]n the eyes of ‘patriot’ authorities, the circumstances of [loyalists’] birth, residence,
or behavior sufficed in law to prove them citizens of the new states. Their continued residence under the new
republican governments after independence evinced their choice of allegiance, and adherence to Great Britain
thereafter proved them not loyal subjects but disloyal citizens.”); Hamilton, supra note 106, at 533 (“By the
declaration of Independence on the 4th of July, in the year 1776, acceded to by our Convention on the ninth, the
late colony of New-York became an independent state. All the inhabitants, who were subjects under the former
government, and who did not withdraw themselves upon the change which took place, were to be considered as
citizens, owing allegiance to the new government. This, at least, is the legal presumption; and this was the
principle, in fact, upon which all the measures of our public councils have been grounded.”).
196. See, e.g., Dawson’s Lessee v. Godfrey, 8 U.S. 321, 322–23 (1807) (holding that those who were born
under the allegiance of Great Britain and who never changed allegiance to the new American government are
aliens); see also Bernadette Meyler, The Gestation of Birthright Citizenship, 1868-1898 States’ Rights, the Law
of Nations, and Mutual Consent, 15 GEO. IMMMIGR. L.J. 519, 527–29 (2001) (discussing reliance on Calvin’s
Case in post-revolutionary litigation concerning the inheritance rights of those born before the revolution).
197. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 183–84. The insistence on an act of volitional allegiance may also have
reflected the Lockean view, current among some of the framing generation, that citizenship required a voluntary
choice of affiliation. Consistent with this view, some in the 1780s believed that “birth” could not confer full
citizenship—one had to continue to affiliate with the state upon one’s majority to become an actual “citizen.”
See SMITH, supra note 46, at 130 (noting Locke’s view that “children were not members of any political
community”).
198. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 183–84, 193–98.
199. Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 122 (1830).
200. An Act Relative to Debts Due to Persons Within Enemies Lines (July 12, 1782), in LAWS OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK, PASSED AT POUGHKEEPSIE, IN THE FIRST MEETING OF THE S IXTH SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE
499, 499 (1782).
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persons who remained or had gone into enemy lines as “inhabitants” of the
state.201
After the Revolutionary War, some New Yorkers argued the act affected
enforcement actions by British creditors who had remained or gone into enemy
territory. Alexander Hamilton, however, argued the term “inhabitants” referred,
in context, to New York citizens who were “within the enemy’s power or lines.”
It did not apply to “British subjects” in British-controlled territory.202 The text
of the statute itself supported his argument, because the statute referred, later in
act, to the New York inhabitants at issue as state “citizens.”203 The statute thus
stayed actions for debts by New Yorkers whose attachment or loyalty to New
York was in question because they had taken up a domicile in enemy territory
but did not reach ordinary British subjects.204 Other examples of similar usage
recur during revolutionary and post-revolutionary period.205
The upshot was that in 1787 citizenship and domicile were associated
terms. But citizenship in 1787 remained a concept that communicated an
expectation of attachment or social ties. Domicile, in turn, mattered to
citizenship as a legal matter because it was a common legal proxy for affective
attachment to a community on which the status of citizen was predicated.
It’s likely that the link between domicile and social attachment also played
a role, at least initially, in the nineteenth-century prize cases themselves. The
link between domicile and affective attachment, after all, extended well into the
late antebellum period. Even as late as 1858, the influential English international
law scholar John Westlake would characterize the test for changing a legal
domicile in “international private law” (the term, at the time, for the principles
of conflict of laws) as a test for assessing whether one has “transfer[red] the
sentiments of home” by forming “attachments” to a new locality.206
As a result, at the turn of the nineteenth century, domicile in a foreign state
may have suggested the American abroad had formed enough of an actual,
functional attachment to a foreign territory to justify confiscation of an
American citizen’s property as the property of an “enemy,” although not enough
201. Id. (“Whereas many of the inhabitants of this State who have not remained within the enemies [sic]
power, and who were indebted to others who did so remain . . . .”).
202. Alexander Hamilton, Philo Camillus No. 3 (August 12, 1795), in 19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, 1795-1795, at 124, 134 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973) (“It was natural too to understand the word
inhabitants as equivalent to citizens” and in contradistinction to “British subjects”). Hamilton also noted that this
was a narrow construction of the term, implying the usual sense of inhabitant was broader than citizen.
203. An Act Relative to Debts Due to Persons, supra note 200, at 499 (referring to the “relief of such Citizens
of this State”).
204. Hamilton, supra note 106, at 533 (“By the declaration of Independence on the 4th of July, in the year
1776, acceded to by our Convention on the ninth, the late colony of New-York became an independent state. All
the inhabitants, who were subjects under the former government, and who did not withdraw themselves upon
the change which took place, were to be considered as citizens, owing allegiance to the new government. This,
at least, is the legal presumption; and this was the principle, in fact, upon which all the measures of our public
councils have been grounded.”).
205. See 8 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 104, at 397 (May 29, 1777) (letter
addressed to the “Inhabitants of the United States of America,” with the salutation “Friends and FellowCitizens”); 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, at 341 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1914) (June 21, 1782)
(referring interchangeably to “citizens” and “inhabitants” of the United States).
206. WESTLAKE, supra note 177, at 41.
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to justify a criminal prosecution.207 (This was exactly the same result—
vulnerability to confiscation in times of war, but no criminal jeopardy¾that
would obtain if America, at the time, had recognized a formal right of
expatriation).208
The result was that, in early nineteenth-century international law, the word
“citizen” was drafted to convey a presumption of a functional attachment to a
foreign political community through a change in domicile, serving as a makeshift bridge to Congress’s eventual recognition of a formal right of expatriation
in American law after the Civil War.209
On a parallel track (and perhaps influenced both by the typical preratification requirements for state citizenship as well as evolving international
law standards), the concept of citizenship through domicile helped select a
unique state to which each American was attached, in a way that made coherent
sense of the Constitution’s language and structure. The Privileges and
Immunities Clause prospectively qualified each native or naturalized citizen of
the United States for the enjoyment of rights of citizenship in every state210—
but it would take an act of purposeful attachment to a given state, indicated by a
choice of domicile, to make one a “citizen” of a particular state within the
meaning of Article III.211
In either case, these new uses of the term preserved continuity with a legal
and popular view, in the decade after the revolution, that “citizenship”
communicated an expectation that one had formed a voluntary “attachment” or
the “sentiments of home” in relation to a particular political community.

IV. CORPORATIONS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CITIZENSHIP
CLAUSE
The end of the eighteenth century isn’t the only period with which
originalists must be concerned. In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment added what
the original constitution lacked—a general definition of national and state
citizenship.
Because each term in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause
207. This conception of the role of domicile seemed to animate Justice Marshall’s dissent (his longest) in
The Venus. See The Venus, 12 U.S. 253, 291–92 (1814) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The stranger merely residing
in a country during peace, however long his stay, and whatever his employment, provided it be such as strangers
may engage in, cannot, on the principles of national law, be considered as incorporated into that society, so as,
immediately on a declaration of war, to become the enemy of his own.”).
208. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 277–78.
209. Expatriation Act of 1868, 15 Stat. 223 (1868) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1841).
210. Prentiss v. Barton, 19 F. Cas. 1276, 1276 (C.C.D. Va. 1819) (noting that the privileges-and-immunities
clause makes the citizens of each state to a degree “citizens of the several states,” but noting the judiciary article
nonetheless makes “a distinction between them, in their right to sue in Courts of the union,” since, otherwise,
citizens of the states could never qualify for diversity jurisdiction).
211. Chief Justice Marshall, who articulated the basic criteria for Article III citizenship in Prentiss v. Barton,
seemed to allude to this view of the domicile requirement for Article III citizenship. He described establishing a
domicile in the state as being “incorporated into the body of the state.” Prentiss, 19 F. Cas. at 1276–77. But see
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 631 (Boston, Hillard, Gray, &
Co. 1833) (suggesting that a change in inhabitance changes state citizenship through the operation of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, rather than through a change in allegiance).
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employs operative sortal terms—“born” and “naturalized”¾applicable only to
real human beings, the Citizenship Clause, while settling profound questions
about who is part of the American political community, didn’t expand the term
beyond its original natural person boundary. Rather, it ratified a continuing
popular association of citizens with natural persons.
Below we review the evidence.

A. “BORN” AND “NATURALIZED”: THE OPERATIVE TERMS OF THE CITIZENSHIP
CLAUSE
Under the unique demands of the immediate post-revolutionary period,
Americans, we showed above,212 employed the solidaristic concept of volitional
allegiance as the principal mechanism for sorting between American “citizens”
and “non-citizens.” After the revolution, citizens were those who formed a
solidaristic attachment to the new republic by tacitly or expressly pledging their
faith to the newly independent American states.
In the common law formula for subjecthood, though, subjects were either
“born” or “naturalized.” Those born under the protection of a new political
community presumptively had a natural attachment—“faith and love”¾toward
the community of their birth, making them “natural” subjects.213 Those who
acquired an attachment not native to them through continued residence could be
rewarded with subjecthood via naturalization.
While these common law criteria appeared inconsistently in linguistic
evidence for the meaning of citizen in the lead up to 1787, the Constitution, by
making “natural born citizenship” of the United States a qualification for the
Presidency while giving Congress the power of “naturalization,” seemed to
ratify both parts of the common law formula.214
And after 1787, “birth in the allegiance” of the United States and
naturalization became popularly understood as the two paths to American
“citizenship.”215 Yet, for those Americans bent on excluding free blacks from
equal rights, awarding citizenship based on native birth would not do.
Accordingly, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, pro-slavery forces
supplemented the common law criteria for citizenship in order to exclude
African Americans from the equality that American citizenship promised. That

212. See supra notes 190–199 and accompanying text.
213. See 1 BACON, supra note 73, at 76 (“[E]very man is presumed to bear Faith and Love to that Prince
and Country where he first received Protection during his Infancy . . . .”); 1 VATTEL, supra note 99, §119 at 52
(“[L]ove of our country is natural to all men. The good and wife author of nature has taken care to bind them,
by a kind of instinct, to the places where they received their first breath, and they love their own nation, as a
thing with which they are intimately connected.”).
214. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
215. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 287 (noting that after ratification, “[n]o one appeared to reexamine and
justify Coke’s idea of the ‘natural born citizen.’ Americans merely continued to assume ‘birth within the
allegiance’ conferred the status and its accompanying rights”); Meyler, supra note 196, at 528–30 (surveying
American courts’ reliance on Coke’s opinion before and after the revolution).
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effort reached its awful nadir in Dred Scott v. Sandford,216 which posited
additional race-based identity criteria that limited “natural born citizenship” to
whites.217
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause undid Dred Scott, by
specifying that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State where they reside.”218 This is a general definitional clause that collectively
clarifies all of the Constitution’s citizenship provisions using the operative terms
“born” and “naturalized.”
And, precisely because the common law “assumptions about the origins,
character, and effects of citizenship were so pervasive” during antebellum
debates about immigration and racial equality, birth and naturalization had, in
the context of antebellum citizenship-talk, a well-understood meaning, which
we turn to explore in the next Subparts.219
B. “BORN” CITIZENS WERE NATURAL PERSONS
Birth, of course, has a literal and a figurative sense. But as Webster’s
Dictionary (1828) noted, birth was generally used to mean “[t]he act of coming
into life, or of being born” and “[e]xcept in poetry, it is generally applied to
human beings; as the birth of a son.”220
The literal meaning of birth played a constitutive role in the common law
test for subjecthood. Those “born” into subjecthood were literally born, thanks
to the simple syllogism at the heart of Calvin’s Case: Born subjects had a duty
of allegiance. The ascription of a duty of allegiance was declarative.221 It
reflected in the law the internal state of mind of born subjects, because “God”
had placed the natural sentiment of allegiance in the “soul” of men born under
the king’s protection.222 To have a soul, is to be embodied—to be a real, not a
legally constructed, person.223 And so, the formula that linked birth to allegiance
identified the possessor of natural allegiance as someone who had experienced
a natural birth—a natural person, not a legal construct.224
Following the common law tradition, the popular debates over the relation
216. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405–27 (1857).
217. Taney’s opinion also excluded native born African Americans from the scope of the Naturalization
Clause, thereby relegating them, absent a constitutional amendment, to a perpetually inferior caste status. See
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 49, at 356–57.
218. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
219. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 287–88.
220. 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 23 (New York, S.
Converse 1828) (defining “birth”); see also id. at 198 (defining “born”).
221. ANONYMOUS, supra note 70, at 208 (natural allegiance is “intrinsic and primitive”).
222. Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 385 (K.B.) (“[L]igeance, and faith and trust which are her
members and parts, are qualities of the mind and soul of man . . . .”); id. at 392 (the duty of allegiance “is written
with the finger of God in the heart of man”).
223. See Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.).
224. The same implication, of course, followed from the decision’s affective conception of allegiance. As
Ellesmere put it in his summary of the case, allegiance is a human sentiment and therefore is only ever given by
a “natural body” to a “natural body.” EGERTON, supra note 88, at 101. Since natural bodies—real people born
to real parents¾are the only ones who exhibit the allegiance that makes a “subject,” “natural born” subjects are,
a fortiori, also persons who are literally “born.”
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of birth to American citizenship in the 1840s and 1850s over immigration and
abolition would also associate “born” citizenship exclusively with literal
birth.225
To take one example: in 1845, at the start of the influx of refugees from
Ireland’s great potato famine, Massachusetts congressman Robert Winthrop
introduced a resolution urging Congress to consider “an immediate and thorough
revision” to the federal naturalization statutes in order to protect the “purity of
the ballot box.”226 Rep. Lewis Levin then urged Congress to increase the
statutory residency period for naturalization (to an astounding twenty-one years)
and consider other reforms targeted at reducing the “influence of foreigners.”227
The advocates of naturalization reform, in turn, sounded nativist themes that
would become central to the xenophobic Know Nothing movement that raged
over the next decade.
Their arguments emphasized the “fact of alien birth . . . in connection with
the known feelings of the human heart toward the spot of native home,”228 in a
way that showcased the dark side of affective republicanism:229 The “foreign
born,” nativists argued, are raised in a foreign culture without familiarity for
republican values or institutions.230 As a result, the “naturalized” citizen lacks
“affection” and “attachment” for America that characterizes a true “citizen”.231
(The argument was a euphemistic cover for religious bigotry against
Catholics).232
The anti-nativists233 countered that “our whole experience teaches us
225. 1 BOUVIER, supra note 36, at 72 (defining “birth,” for purposes of assigning legal statuses, as not only
having a “mother” but also being “brought wholly into the world independent of one’s mother”—for example,
viability outside the mother’s womb).
226. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1845) (opening debate on Massachusetts resolution); CONG.
GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1845) (introduction of Massachusetts resolution by Winthrop).
227. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 46–50 (1845) (speech of Rep. Levin). Rep. Lucien
Chase suggested that Rep. Winthrop and that “delegation from his State coincided in opinion with the Native
Americans.” CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 67 (1845).
228. See CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 63–64 (1845) (Rep. Sims) (characterizing the
position of the nativists).
229. See Shklar, supra note 79, at 195 (“The approval of group-based loyalty and arguments for and against
political obligation based on such loyalty tends, however, to mute, indeed to forget, that exclusion is an
unavoidable and essential feature of such loyalty.”); Jacob T. Levy, Against Fraternity: Democracy Without
Solidarity, in THE STRAINS OF COMMITMENT: THE POLITICAL SOURCES OF SOLIDARITY IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES
107, 119 (Keith Banting & Will Kymlicka eds., 2017) (noting the “persistent” theme of “solidaristic unity” in
the American and French republican traditions and arguing we would be better off discarding this part of that
tradition); Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship Through the Prism of Alienage, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1285,
1316–24 (2002) (noting the exclusionary implications of the tradition of associating equal citizenship with
national solidarity).
230. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 46–50 (1845) (Rep. Levin).
231. Id.; see also CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 88 (1845) (Rep. Bedinger) (characterizing
nativists as questioning the “attachment” of emigrants to American principles); CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st
Sess. Appendix 44–45 (1845) (Rep. Bowlin) (characterizing nativists as questioning the “affection” of emigrants
for the American project); CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong. 1st Sess. Appendix 67–68 (1845) (Rep. Chase) (agreeing
with opponents that the “existence of our government depends on the attachment of its citizens,” but arguing
that “for a zealous attachment” to American institutions, the foreign born are “unsurpassed”).
232. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE M EN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE
THE CIVIL WAR 226–60 (2d ed. 1995).
233. In the debates in the mid-1840s cited above, many of the advocates of immigration were southern
Democrats and their pro-“equality” and anti-“oppression” rhetoric was by turns explicitly and implicitly
racialized—it extended equality and inclusion only to white immigrants. For more on the complicated ways that
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that . . . [naturalized citizens] are equally, as much attached to [American
institutions], if not more so.”234 The native-born citizen, explained
Representatives Lucien Chase, Henry Bedinger, and James Bowlin, often lacks
the “appreciation for the equality of rights” of the original revolutionary
generation, which risked their lives on “the tented field.”235 By contrast, the very
fact of foreign birth made emigrants more patriotic than the home born—
because of their birth in a foreign land, they have a “fresh” and “living and
breathing” experience of the “pain” of “oppressive” foreign government.236 And
so, while the “ties of kindred and blood will often call [an emigrant’s] memories
back” to the “land of his birth,” “the same memory . . . will “fire his heart with
indignation against the system of oppression which drove him away” while
fueling “appreciation” or “gratitude” for the American “practice of justice.” 237
In this and other debates, nativists and immigration advocates agreed that
the birth that mattered to citizenship was literal, not figurative. To be “born” in
a way that mattered to citizenship was also to develop attachments based on
lived social experience—that is, to live a life. For nativists, birth in the United
States meant one had been “presumably educated from infancy in the values and
habits . . . [of] self-government,” and therefore presumptively attached to
republican society.238 For immigration advocates, to be foreign born or a
“naturalized” emigrant meant you had presumably suffered oppression and love
justice, tangible human sentiments born of lived experience that were an even
stronger qualification for citizenship. 239 All agreed that the labels citizen and
alien applied to persons who were literally born somewhere.
The normative importance of literal “birth” to citizenship-talk would also
figure prominently in the abolitionist movement. One challenge for abolitionists
was persuading moderates alienated by attacks, like William Lloyd Garrison’s,
on the legitimacy of the antebellum Constitution. In response, abolitionist legal
theorists developed arguments that abolition was, in fact, constitutionally
required.
These arguments were developed across the works of William Yates,240

debates over immigration, racism, and slavery intersected in the antebellum period, see FONER, supra note 232,
at 226–60.
234. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 88 (1845) (Rep. Bedinger).
235. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 68 (1845) (Rep. Chase).
236. Id.
237. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 88 (1845) (Rep. Bedinger); see also CONG. GLOBE,
29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 44–45 (1845) (Rep. Bowlin); CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 64
(1845) (Rep. Sims) (arguing it is the American “practice of justice” that kindles the “feeling” of patriotic
attachment to the country).
238. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 287 (characterizing the traditional understanding of the link between birth
and allegiance); see CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 46–50 (1845) (Rep. Levin) (arguing for
extension of residency requirements for naturalization based on claims the foreign-born lack the attachment of
the “natives” or “native-born”).
239. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 67–68 (1845) (Rep. Chase) (agreeing that the “existence
of our government depends on the attachment of our citizens,” but arguing that “for a zealous attachment” to
American institutions, the foreign born are “unsurpassed”).
240. See WILLIAM YATES, THE RIGHTS OF COLORED MEN TO SUFFRAGE, CITIZENSHIP AND TRIAL BY JURY
(Philadelphia, Merrihew & Gunn 1838).
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Lysander Spooner,241 and Joel Tiffany.242 “Citizen,” Yates argued, is a category
that vests recipients with equal rights. And, Yates noted, “the foundation of
[citizenship is] allegiance.”243 The foundation of natural allegiance, however,
was not race. It was, simply, “birth” within “the jurisdiction of” the United
States. And thus, under the common law, “all who are born within the
jurisdiction of the State,” including free blacks, owe natural “allegiance” to the
United States, making them “full citizens.”244 Lysander Spooner and Joel
Tiffany would go on to link the argument to the original public meaning of
“citizen” in the text of the Constitution, and push the argument to its logical
conclusion: native born slaves, too, were “citizens,” making them free men who
had been unlawfully enslaved by the southern states.245
As Martha Jones extensively recounts, the argument for birthright
citizenship became a rallying cry for free black civil rights activists in the 1830s,
1840s, and 1850s.246 “If we are asked what evidence we bring to sustain our
qualifications for citizenship, we will offer them certificates of our BIRTH and
NATIVITY,” declared activists in Pennsylvania. “[T]he vote was ‘OUR
RIGHT,’” said a delegation of Connecticut free blacks, “as native born MEN,
Citizens of the great Republic.”247
These legal claims were morally potent precisely because being “born” into
equal citizenship was not figurative. When we refer to “natural born citizens,”
Lincoln’s Attorney General Edward Bates would write in his widely published
1862 opinion arguing in favor of the citizenship of free blacks, we mean those
who are “not made by law or otherwise, but born” into a state of equality. Like
the rest of us, free blacks, he wrote, “became citizens in the natural way, by
birth.”248
The argument’s force lay precisely in the fact that the legal status of natural
“born” citizen did not belong to fictive “persons.” It was legal and moral status
that, because it belongs to human beings who are “born” in a state of legal and
moral equality, refuted the dehumanizing premises of chattel slavery. Extending
241. See LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (Boston, Bela Marsh 1845).
242. See JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1849). The argument
from birthright citizenship to racial equality predated the Revolution—it has its origins in the works of
revolutionary thinker James Otis. James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, in THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY SOURCES 119, 122 (Bruce Frohnen ed., 2002) (“That the colonists, black and
white, born here, are free born British subjects, and entitled to all the essential civil rights of such, is a
truth . . . manifest . . . from the principles of the common law . . . .”).
243. YATES, supra note 240, at 37.
244. Id. at 36–37 (“In all the writers on public law there is one ancient and universal classification of the
people of a country; all who are born within the jurisdiction of a State are natives, and all others are aliens. This
classification grows out of the doctrine of natural allegiance, a tie created by birth.”).
245. See SPOONER, supra note 241, at 156 (“The constitution of the United States recognizes that all men
are born free; for it recognizes the principle that natural birth in the country gives citizenship. . . . And no
exception is made to the rule.”); TIFFANY, supra note 242, at 86–97 (“[U]pon every principles of reasoning, all
colored persons, as well as others, who have been born within the jurisdiction of the United States, whether they
have been deemed slaves, of freemen, are citizens thereof, and as such . . . entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of Citizenship.”).
246. MARTHA S. JONES, BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA
(2018).
247. Id. at 64.
248. Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 389 (1862) (emphasis added).
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citizenship based on birth, explained the Baltimore abolitionist and suffragette
Frances E.W. Harper, acknowledges that “we are all bound up together in one
great bundle of humanity.”249
We, finally, confirmed that the preceding examples of usage were standard
by reviewing articles in the Library of Congress’s searchable “Chronicling
America” database of American newspapers. We reviewed 200 unique
newspaper pages published between 1855–60 and 1866–68 using the word
“born” as a qualifier of “citizen.” We classified references to born citizens as
references to human beings based on descriptions attributing to the citizens at
issue behavior or characteristics limited to human beings, including parents,
familial status, ethnicity, physical traits, military service, party registration, and
voting.
In 18.5% of the pages, the terms “born” and “citizen” were used generically
in an indeterminate context. Every other page we examined employed the term
“born” citizen to refer to real human beings. We could find no example of the
use of either term in relation to corporations or other abstract objects, other than
one article noting that corporations are not “natural born” citizens.250
C. “NATURALIZED” CITIZENS WERE NATURAL PERSONS
The Citizenship Clause also defines “naturalized” persons as citizens of the
United States and of the states in which they reside. Although “naturalized” was
sometimes used figuratively,251 the word was always employed in antebellum
discussions of citizenship to convey a legal status of “born” or natural persons.

249. FRANCES E.W. HARPER, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH NATIONAL WOMEN ’S RIGHTS CONVENTION
45–46 (1866); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 260 n.*
(1998) (discussing how the Civil Rights Act of 1866 formed the backdrop for the Eleventh Women’s Rights
Convention). Congress spent little time discussing the meaning of the term “born” in the Citizenship Clause
(suggestive that the word, in context, had an obvious meaning). But see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
3032 (1866) (Sen. Henderson) (characterizing “born” persons as “born of . . . parents”). Proponents of the
Amendment, or its precursor, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, embraced this sense when explaining the Clause’s
effect. The Citizenship Clause and its statutory precursor would secure for African Americans the privileges and
immunities of citizenship. These were equal “civil” or “personal” rights, which were in turn variously equated
with “human rights,” the rights that “appertain to every free man,” or the “natural rights of man” that government
was formed to protect and secure. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (Rep. Wilson) (“civil
rights” are the “natural rights of man”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 344 (1866) (Sen. Wilson) (“We
stand as the champions of human rights . . . .”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474, 476 (1866) (Sen.
Trumbull) (stating that the Civil Rights Act secures “natural liberty, so far as restrained by human laws . . . for
the general advantage of the public”). For further discussion of the meaning of “men,” which was a term reserved
for “human beings,” see infra note 268 and accompanying text; see also Marcantel, supra note 38, at 263 &
n.259 (collecting additional evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers associated citizenship and
human rights).
250. See “Who Are Disenfranchised?”, RAFTSMAN’S JOURNAL (Clearfield, Pa.), Oct. 4, 1865,
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/data/batches/pst_lasch_ver01/data/sn85054616/00212477813/1865100401/
0020.pdf (stating that a person is a citizen of the United States by “birth or naturalization” and “the word ‘citizen’
was well understood, as it is now understood, to mean a human being—a natural person . . . of whom allegiance
is predicable”) (third column).
251. See, for example, Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Berens v. Rucker, in which he characterized the act of
permitting a foreign ship to trade with all the privileges of a domestic ship as “naturaliz[ing]” the ship. Berens
v. Rucker (1761) 96 Eng. Rep. 175, 176 (K.B.) (“The rule is, that if a neutral ship trade to a French colony, with
all the privileges of a French ship, and is thus adopted and naturalized, it must be looked upon as a French
ship . . . .”).
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In this, usage again followed the pattern set in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries.
The eighteenth-century editions of Coke’s Institutes defined naturalization
as a status conferred on “aliens,” or persons “born in a strange country” and
therefore “out of the ligeance” of the King.252 In his Commentaries, Blackstone
similarly defined “naturalization” exclusively as a status awarded to aliens.253
“By [naturalization,]” he wrote, “an alien is put in exactly the same state as if he
had been born in the king’s ligeance.”254 An “alien,” in turn, was “one born out
of the King’s dominions.”255
Similarly, Webster’s dictionary defined naturalization in its legal sense, as
the “confer[ral] on an alien the rights and privileges of a native subject or citizen;
to adopt foreigners into a nation or state, and place them in the condition of
natural born subjects.”256 “Foreigners,” in turn, were “person[s] born in a foreign
country, or without the country or jurisdiction of which one speaks.”257 Thus,
“[a] naturalized person is a citizen; but we still call him a foreigner by birth.”258
Antebellum treatises would define naturalization the same way. Thus
William Alexander Duer’s textbook on American constitutional law (sometimes
credited as the first of its kind) explained:
The Constitution contains no definition of the character of a citizen; but the
term is used in plain reference to the Common Law, which . . . in many
instances must be resorted to as the interpreter of its meaning. . . . At the time
the Constitution was adopted, the Citizens of each State, collectively,
constituted the citizens of the United States; and were either native Citizens,
or those born within the United States, or naturalized Citizens, or persons born
elsewhere, but who, upon assuming the allegiance, had become entitled to, the
privileges of native Citizens.259

Similarly, the vast majority of antebellum naturalization acts “presuppose[d] that all who are to be benefited by their provisions were born
abroad.”260 And, in Dred Scott v. Sandford both Justice Taney, in his opinion for
252. EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 129a (Hargrave &
Butler, rev. 1832) (1628).
253. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *362.
254. Id.
255. Id. at *361 (emphasis added); see also 1 BOUVIER, supra note 36, at 66 (“There must be a union of
birth abroad, and subjection to some other power to make an alien . . . .”); 1 BURN & BURN, supra note 73, at 30
(“Alien is one born out of the dominions of the crown of England.”); GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY
CONTAINING THE INTERPRETATION AND DEFINITION OF WORDS USED IN THE LAW 444 (6th ed. 1750) (defining
an alien as “[o]ne born in a Strange Country, and out of the Allegiance of the King”); 1 BACON, supra note 73,
at 76 (“An alien is one born in a Strange Country and different Society, to which he is presumed to have a natural
and necessary Allegiance . . . .”).
256. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, THE AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 162 (1828).
257. 1 WEBSTER, supra note 220, at 684.
258. Id. (emphasis added).
259. WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, OUTLINES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES 165 (New York, Collins & Hannay 1833) (emphasis added); 1 BOUVIER, supra note 36, at 64 (“A
naturalized citizen is one who, born an alien, has acquired the right of a citizen . . . .”).
260. Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 664 (N.Y. Ch. 1844). Thus, noted New York Vice Chancellor
Sandford in Lynch v. Clarke, “The [federal naturalization statutes] abound in expressions of this sort, viz.: the
country ‘from which he came;’ all ‘persons who may arrive in the United States;’ the country whence they
migrated is to be stated, and the like. This language is inappropriate to a person who was born here, and wholly
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the Court, and dissenter Justice Curtis agreed that naturalization was a power
limited to altering the status of “persons born in a foreign country.”261 Wrote
Curtis:
It is not doubted that this is a power to prescribe a rule for the removal of the
disabilities consequent on foreign birth. To hold that it extends further than
this, would do violence to the meaning of the term naturalization, fixed in the
common law, and in the minds of those who concurred in framing and
adopting the Constitution. . . . [T]he only power expressly granted to Congress
to legislate concerning citizenship, is confined to the removal of the
disabilities of foreign birth.262

The public debate over slavery was also concerned with “naturalization.”
William Yates’ treatise on the rights of free blacks suggested that naturalization
was a power limited to granting citizenship to the foreign born.263 That fact
requires treating native born African Americans as “already citizens,” since,
otherwise, an absurdity would result: since they are home born, and therefore
not within the scope of the naturalization power, African Americans “[could]
not be made [citizens] by Congress” and so would be “worse than foreigners.”264
Attorney General Bates, in his opinion on the citizenship of free blacks,
also defined “naturalization” the same way—by reference to the circumstances
of actual birth. The naturalization power, he wrote, is power of
“legal . . . adoption” of the “foreign born.”265 Citizens are thus either “home
born” or “alien—foreign-born” who have, by process of law, been “naturalized,”
or made in the eyes of the law equal to the “home born.”266
Many abolitionists, however, denied that birth in a foreign jurisdiction was
always a prerequisite. In debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
granted freed slaves the privileges and immunities of citizenship, opponents
cited Justice Curtis for the proposition that Congress lacked the power to
“naturalize” native born freed blacks, because they were not “foreign born.”267
Senator Trumbull and his allies, following abolitionists like Spooner,268
argued the naturalization power was not limited simply to the foreign born.
However, they continued to describe the class of persons to whom naturalization
inapplicable to one who has always resided in the country.” Id.
261. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 417 (1857) (citations omitted).
262. Id. at 578 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
263. YATES, supra note 240, at 71.
264. Id. (excerpting arguments in the case of Prudence Crandall). Yates did not make the argument himself
but excerpted this argument in his book.
265. Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 389 (1862).
266. Id. (“The Constitution itself does not make the citizens (it is in fact made by them). It only intends and
recognizes such of them as are natural—home–born—and provides for the naturalization of such as them as are
alien—foreign–born, making the latter, as far as nature will allow, like the former”).
267. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 524–25 (1866) (Sen. Davis) (When “naturalization” is used in its
ordinary sense—that is, when applied “to a man”—“[t]he subject upon which alone and exclusively the
naturalization [power] . . . can operate is a foreigner”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1152 (1866) (Rep.
Rogers) (“It is well settled that the laws in regard to naturalization have no reference except to foreigners, and
are not intended to include persons who were born here.”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1163 (1866)
(Rep. Rogers) (citing Curtis, J.).
268. SPOONER, supra note 241, at 112 (arguing naturalization is the “undoubted power to
offer . . . citizenship to every person in the country, whether foreigner or native, who is not already a citizen”).
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applied as human beings. Naturalization, said Senator Thayer, was properly
defined as a power over either foreigners “born abroad” or those “born in this
country”;269 or, alternatively, as the power to give to “a man, or any class of men,
the same rights the same rights of citizenship which belong to a natural-born
citizen of the country.”270 “Men”—the term used to describe the class to which
naturalization is applicable¾was a term that, in the nineteenth century,
described “members of the human race” or “mankind.”271
And, again, examining the use of the term “naturalize” or “naturalization”
in the context of discussions of citizenship in the Chronicling America database
confirmed this pattern of usage. We reviewed 200 unique newspaper pages
published between 1855–60 and 1866–68 using the word “naturalized” as a
qualifier of “citizen.” We classified references to naturalized citizens as
references to natural persons based on descriptions attributing to the citizens at
issue behavior or characteristics limited to human beings, including parents,
familial status, ethnicity, physical traits, military service, party registration, and
voting. In 16% of the pages, the terms naturalized citizen was used generically
in an indeterminate context. Every other page we examined employed the term
“naturalized” citizen to refer to real human beings. We could find no uses of the
term “naturalized” to refer corporations.
***
The upshot: By defining citizen using terms—birth and naturalization—
limited to natural persons, the Citizenship Clause did not expand the term
“citizen” to encompass corporations. Article III citizens were natural persons in
1787, and they remained so after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.

CONCLUSION
A few years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice
Curtis argued that corporations are not Article III citizens as an original
matter.272 A decade earlier, John Codman Hurd had suggested that Article III
uses the term “citizen” in a different sense, drawn from international law, that
has nothing to do with the conferral of rights and immunities under domestic
law. It is a term, he argued, for “belonging” to a state in the eyes of international
law—one that encompasses corporations and other “legal persons” subject to a
state’s “personal jurisdiction” by virtue of a domicile.273
Justice Curtis’s claim is the correct one. At the two relevant fixation
periods, 1787–88 and 1866–68, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that clauses
employing the term “citizen” were limited to natural persons.
In 1787–88, the public meaning of citizen communicated, at a minimum,
269. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st. Sess. 1152 (1866) (Sen. Thayer).
270. Id.; CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 500 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull) (Congress has the power to make
“every inhabitant” a citizen “no matter where born”).
271. See 1 BOUVIER, supra note 36, at 57 (“Any human being is a man . . . .”).
272. See supra notes 3–7 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 178 and accompanying text.
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that the status holder was expected to have a solidaristic tie to the status-granting
community, a tie which only real human beings can form. In 1787–88,
citizenship thus had a sortal boundary—it was a term that did not extend beyond
the set of human beings.
The Fourteenth Amendment added monumentally important content to the
meaning of “citizen” across the Constitution. It overturned Dred Scott, affirming
the set of citizens is not restricted with regard to race—it is a term open to “all”
human beings who meet its race-neutral definitional criteria. And, in the process,
it shifted the conception of citizenship away from its original emphasis on a
community of allegiance toward an understanding of citizenship as a community
of equal human rights and equal human dignity.274 But because it defined
citizenship in terms—“birth” and “naturalization”—reserved for human beings,
it did not expand the set of citizens beyond the boundaries set down in 1787–88.
Hurd’s new concept of Article III citizenship was an obscure specialist
sense that developed between ratification of Article III and the Fourteenth
Amendment. But that sense was not part of the word’s popular meaning and was
never ratified by amendments to the Constitution’s text.
“Citizen,” as the term was defined and used in the Constitution, is
conceptually tied to humanity. The original public meaning of the word “citizen”
communicated powerful normative ideas relating to human political
relationships and human rights, but did not encompass abstract objects, like
corporations.
Recovering and implementing the original public meaning of “citizen”
could have profound implications for contemporary constitutional doctrine. It
also has interesting implications for bigger picture debates about originalism. A
full exploration of those implications is beyond the scope of this Article, but in
this conclusion, we will sketch some of the most likely possibilities.
First, modern diversity doctrine, applied to corporations, cannot be squared
with the original public meaning of Article III. Section (c) of the statutory grant
of original diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332) treats corporations as
citizens of the states in which they are incorporated and in which they operate
their “principal place of business.”275 This reflects Hurd’s conception of Article
III citizens, not the text’s original meaning.
Because as an original matter, corporation qua corporations are not Article
III citizens, the current statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction exceeds
Congress’s authority. Congress does not have the power to change the
constitutional meaning of “citizen” through legislation; rather, the constitutional
grant of diversity jurisdiction operates as a limit on Congress’s power to confer
original subject-matter jurisdiction on “such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.”276 In other words, Section 1332(c), as it
stands, is unconstitutional from an originalist perspective.
This fact should, we note, also give living constitutionalists pause. This is
274. See supra notes 240–246 and accompanying text.
275. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2019).
276. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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not a close case. To the extent that living constitutionalists give substantial (if
not decisive) weight to the clear and unequivocal meaning of the constitutional
text, there is a prima facie case against Section 1332(c).
Perhaps corporate diversity jurisdiction can be salvaged by amending
Section 1332(c). However, there is only one route such an amendment could
take: the one charted in antebellum cases like Deveaux, where the Supreme
Court allowed corporations to access the federal diversity docket based on the
citizenship of their shareholders. To save corporate diversity jurisdiction, an
amended version of Section 1332(c) would need to rely on the concept of
“minimum diversity” by conferring jurisdiction over corporations when at least
one shareholder of a corporation is a citizen of a state other that the state of
which the opposing party is a citizen.277 This, in turn, would require corporate
litigants to determine whether shareholders are United States citizens and their
states of domicile in order to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction. Of course,
Section 1332(c) does not require such a determination; it confers diversity
jurisdiction irrespective of the citizenship of shareholders.
It is, though, far from clear this fix is consistent with the original meaning
of the diversity clause. Whether it passes originalist muster turns on the original
meaning of the phrase “controversies between” citizens. If the parties “between”
whom “controversies” subsisted were those over whom the court exercises in
personam jurisdiction, then shareholders would usually not qualify as Article III
parties in suits by or against their corporations. In that case, this attempted fix
would be just as unconstitutional from an originalist perspective as the current
version of Section 1332(c). An inquiry into the persons “between” whom Article
III “controversies” subsist is, though, a subject for future research.
Another potential problem with salvaging diversity jurisdiction over
corporations on the basis of shareholder citizenship is that the strategy assumes
the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss278 is only a statutory rule,
not a constitutional requirement. Again, this topic is beyond the scope of this
Article, but we note that Justice Marshall’s very concise opinion in Strawbridge
says nothing about the relationship between the meaning of the diversity statute
and the almost identically worded constitutional provision.279 The supposition
that the Strawbridge rule is not constitutional does not, as far as we are aware,
seem to be grounded in a rigorous investigation of the original public meaning
of Article III. Rather, it seems to us to be an assumption made by contemporary
courts and commentators who assumed a nonoriginalist framework.
It might be argued that the unconstitutionality of corporate diversity
277. Although most cases involving corporate diversity would fit within an amended version of Section
1332(c), there remains a category of cases that are allowed by the current statute but would not be allowed by
an amendment. For example, if all of the relevant shareholders of a corporation were nondiverse from all of the
opposing parties, the amended statute would not confer diversity jurisdiction. This possibility illustrates our
basic point: as written, the current diversity statute confers jurisdiction in cases where the original public
meaning of the word citizen would not—even if the fiction that diversity controversies involving corporations
are actually controversies between shareholders is allowed.
278. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806).
279. Id.
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jurisdiction is not a matter of great consequence. If these cases cannot be heard
in federal court, there will always be a state court forum available. State courts
are courts of general subject-matter jurisdiction, and some state court will have
jurisdiction over any corporation that is incorporated in one of the United States.
But this argument ignores the importance of forum shopping, especially in cases
in which a corporation is the defendant.280 It may well be the case that federal
courts systematically favor corporate defendants represented by Big Law over
individual plaintiffs represented by local plaintiff’s lawyers—although the
investigation of that empirical claim is beyond the scope of this Article. We
believe it is very likely that corporate diversity jurisdiction has important
consequences, and hence that the question whether such jurisdiction is
constitutional is not trivial or insignificant.
The Article’s findings are also important for bigger picture debates about
originalism. First, the findings help shore up originalism against a common
attack: that it is just a cover for “conservative” preferences. In recent years,
progressives have often fought to preserve state control over corporate litigation,
while business conservatives have generally favored expanding federal power
over corporate litigation, at states’ expense, through enactments like the Class
Action Fairness Act. By complicating the scope of corporate diversity
jurisdiction, the results illustrate that originalism is a project that is orthogonal
to any one set of partisan preferences.
On the other hand, the project also shows how originalism, or at least non“faint-hearted” versions, would, if put in the practice, lead to results that unsettle
major features of what might be called the practical or workaday constitution, of
which diversity jurisdiction is a major part. This may lend fuel to critics’
complaints that originalism is too impractical to implement. Stout-hearted
originalists will need to grapple with what the findings here mean for their
approach to originalism as a normative matter.
Faint-hearted originalists who happily adhere to long-settled precedent, by
contrast, won’t face this problem—and will even find the results here help
rationalize some otherwise mysterious features of current precedent. Modern
doctrine, for example, directs that statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction
should be construed narrowly—what has sometimes been termed the Court’s
“anti-jurisdictional canon.” Many have questioned merits of the canon.281 But,
by raising doubts about the constitutionality of corporate diversity jurisdiction,
this Article tees up the possibility that the canon might be rationalized as a
“second-best” strategy, or compensating adjustment, for entrenched
underenforcement of Article III limits on diversity jurisdiction.
These are just some of the further inquiries that flow from the simple but
important fact that corporations’ claim to state citizenship finds no support in
280. See Susan Steinman, Help Fight Corporate Forum Shopping, TRIAL, Apr. 2016, at 16; Stephen B.
Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1439, 1469–70 (2008); George W. Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 28 ILL. L. REV. 356, 361
n.30 (1933).
281. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Jurisdiction Canon, 70 VAND. L. REV. 499 (2017).
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